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ABSTRACT
Grid Computing involves heterogeneous computers and resources, multiple 
administrative domains and the mechanisms and techniques for establishing and 
maintaining effective and secure communications between devices and systems. Both 
authentication and authorization are required. Current authorization models in each 
domain vary from one system to another, which makes it difficult for users to obtain 
authorization across multiple domains at one time.
We propose an enhanced security architecture to provide support for decentralized 
authorization based on attribute certificates which may be accessed via the Internet. This 
allows the administration of privileges to be widely distributed over the Internet in 
support of autonomy for resource owners and providers. In addition, it provides a 
uniform approach for authorization which may be used by resource providers from 
various domains. We combine authentication with the authorization mechanism by using 
both MyProxy online credential repository and LDAP directory server.
In our architecture, we use MyProxy server to store identity certificates for authentication, 
and utilize an LDAP server-based architecture to store attribute certificates for 
authorization. Using a standard web browser, a user may connect to a grid portal and 
allow the portal to retrieve those certificates in order to access grid resources on behalf of 
the user. Thus, our approach can make use of the online credential repository to integrate 
authentication, delegation and attribute based access control together to provide 
enhanced, flexible security for grid system.
Keywords: Grid computing, security, authentication, authorization, PKC, SSL, LDAP, 
GSI, MyProxy, proxy credential, attribute certificate, RBAC, grid portal
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1. INTRODUCTION
Grid Computing involves heterogeneous computers and resources, multiple 
administrative domains and the mechanisms and techniques for establishing and 
maintaining effective and secure commimications between devices and systems. In grid 
environments, the requirements for security tend to increase rapidly, due to the 
complexity of the systems and interconnection models used. Because of the heterogeneity 
of security mechanisms, grid security requirements may vary from one system to another, 
but at least they include authentication, authorization, single sign on and delegation. 
Within security requirements, delegation and distributed authorization are among the 
most challenging issues in grids.
In this thesis, we address the problems of current credential repositories for grid 
computing. We propose a new approach to develop an enhanced and flexible security 
architecture for support of MyProxy using attribute certificates and LDAP server, and 
show how this architecture can provide both authentication and authorization. In addition, 
this architecture can also integrate with current existing technology for Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) and support certificate delegation. Security in large distributed 
systems requires access control based on roles rather than individual identities. Role- 
based management has proved to be a very important technique in reducing 
administrative costs. Finally, we provide support for localized resource ownership-based 
autonomy in setting authorization policy within the context of resource sharing.
1.1 An Overview of Grid Computing
“The Grid is a next-generation Internet” [FosterOl]. It provides secure and high- 
performance mechanisms for remote access and resource sharing. It can also help 
geographically distributed groups work together. The goal of grid computing is to make 
easy, fast and inexpensive access to computing resources across the world.
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[FosterOl] defines grid computing to be different from conventional distributed 
computing because it includes large-scale resource sharing and high performance 
applications. And Grids are used in dynamic virtual organizations which are a group of 
people or institutions sharing computer resources to further their objectives. [FosterOl] 
gives a detailed introduction to grid concepts and technologies. It presents requirements 
and a framework for grid architectures, and protocols and services used among different 
grid systems. Grid computing offers more powerful applications including using 
computer instruments, data-intensive computing, multi-supercomputer simulation, 
collaborative work, and so on. For example, scientists often want to discuss with other 
people in real time after they have performed experiments, therefore, collaborative work 
is required. In addition, they also require the real-time analysis of large amounts of data 
using computer-enhanced instruments. All of these are important applications in grid 
computing.
There are three characteristics for computational grids [Foster98b]:
(1) Heterogeneous. A grid involves many administrative domains and different resources 
that may exist in any place of the world. The computing resources may be different. 
The difference may be in physical devices, system software, and various policies.
(2) Scalable. The grid size may increase when adding resource. The scalability will make 
it not affect the performance of whole system.
(3) Dynamic and unpredictable. Traditional networking systems are predictable. But in
grid-computing environments, there are many resources for sharing, and it is 
impossible to guarantee each resource will not fail sometimes. So some measures will 
be taken dynamically in order to provide the best performance.
1.2 Contribution
Although there is a substantial body of published research and development on 
authentication in Grids, it has not resulted in sufficient standardized mechanisms to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
control user access to grid resources scattered across large-scale networks. Authorization 
mechanisms should combine with authentication mechanisms in order to provide strong 
security service.
Most Grids use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication, but users are required 
to protect their keys by themselves and have to copy certificates to their own systems. It 
is inconvenient and insecure to access the grid credentials. MyProxy is an online 
credential repository system that can solve this kind of problems.
There are two problems in current security architectures. First problem is about grid 
portal. Grid portal provides user interfaces for the grids and allows users to access grid 
resources using standard web browsers. It is based on standard web server and some grid 
enabled software. But grid portals cannot integrate with Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
[Foster98b] because standard web browsers do not support credential delegation while 
GSI support certificate delegation. Second problem is about MyProxy repository. 
MyProxy is used for authentication using identity certificates, but there is little work done 
for authorization. And although it implements delegation, there is no more restriction on 
the delegated credentials except the lifetime.
We propose to use MyProxy to solve the first problem about grid portal. Using MyProxy, 
the user can connect to a Grid portal through a web browser and allows the portal to 
retrieve a proxy credential to access Grid resources on the user’s behalf. In this manner, 
MyProxy can solve the delegation problem and enable grid portals to access GSI 
protected resources.
We provide a solution for the second problem about MyProxy by using attribute 
certificate technology. Attribute certificates can extend identity-based public key 
certificate (PKC) infrastructures towards support for role-based authorization policies 
[Linn99]. First, it allows decentralized authorities to manage identities, roles and 
permissions. Second, it can provide explicit representations of the roles. Third, attributes 
represented in attribute certificates can be separated from identity certificates, which
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allow authorization attributes to be updated more frequently than the identity certificates. 
In addition, the large and constantly changing population of entities requires the access 
policy on roles or groups rather than individual ones. So role-based controls can be 
accomplished more fiexibly when using attribute certificates.
There is another problem with MyProxy. Its protocol does not support uploading of 
attribute certificates. So we propose to use Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 
which is a platform-independent network protocol standard. It can be used across a highly 
heterogeneous network. Moreover, it can also be a gateway to other protocols such as 
X.500 and HTTP. LDAP supports any type of data and various security technologies. 
Therefore we propose to use LDAP and build our LDAP server that can support 
uploading and storing attribute certificates.
The design of the enhanced security architecture for support of online credential 
repository and the deployment of LDAP server for ACs are both innovative and constitute
the main contributions of this thesis.
We design a new and innovative architecture through combining MyProxy and LDAP 
Server to provide both authentication and authorization service for Grids. In this thesis, 
we use attribute certificates to convey privileges, which are separated from identity
credentials used for authentication. The separation of authentication from authorization 
allows for flexible delegation. Our novel enhanced security architecture enables fewer 
overheads than using general access control lists to make access decisions. We set up 
LDAP directory server and deploy environment for adding attribute certificates onto 
LDAP server, and also provide a role design for authorization by using attribute 
certificates. Our enhanced security architecture can support Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) model based on the roles in the attribute certificates. In addition, grid users are 
typically widely dispersed, so our architecture supports distributed authorization.
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1.3 Thesis Statement
1.3.1 Motivation -  Problem
Grid Computing involves heterogeneous computers and resources, multiple 
administrative domains and the mechanisms and techniques for establishing and 
maintaining effective and secure communications between devices and systems. Both 
authentication and authorization are required. Most research in the security area focuses 
on authentication techniques, including digital signatures and public key certificates; but 
there is little work established for building a uniform authorization model for large-scale 
networks. Each local domain authorization model may be different from one system to 
another, which makes it difficult for users to obtain authorization across multiple domains 
at one time.
Some grid security architectures are limited by using access control lists. Having a user 
account on every resource a subject does not scale well to large grids. It not only limits 
scalability, but also hinders collaboration. In grids, resource providers and users are both 
geographically distributed. Without standardized and easily administered authorization 
mechanisms it is impossible to share distributed resources.
Some questions are related to the issue of authorization: how can resource providers to
manage their resource across different domain flexibly? How can users access multiple 
resources and delegate their rights? How to build a standardized authorization model for 
grids? TMs thesis elaborates on solutions that address these questions.
13.2 Solution -  Design Brief
We propose an enhanced and flexible security architecture to provide decentralized 
authorization, based on attribute certificates, which may be accessed via the Internet. We
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seek to provide an authorization mechanism for widely distributed resource providers to 
control their resources flexibly and for users to delegate their rights. Our security 
architecture enables users to share grid resources and support distributed collaboration.
Our solution is based on digital certificates that convey identity, attributes or 
authorization information. This allows the administration of privileges to be widely 
distributed over the Internet. In addition, it provides a unified approach for authorization 
which can be used by resource providers from various domains. It addresses the 
utilization of attribute certificates for support of role based access control and rights 
delegation.
1.3.3 Technology and Tools
We combine with authentication and authorization mechanism by using both MyProxy 
online credential repository and LDAP directory server. In addition, the thesis also 
elaborates on how to deploy LDAP server in order to support using attribute certificates.
MyProxy is a credential repository for the Grid. It allows users to retrieve a credential at 
any time or any place without needing to manage private keys and certificate files. 
However, it only enables users to delegate identity certificates to resources. The identity 
certificate supports only authentication, but not authorization. We propose an approach to 
develop an enhanced security architecture using attribute certificates. An AC can grant 
some attributes to its owner, which is well suited for controlling access to grid resources 
and for implementing role-based authorization.
In grid environment, it is necessary to have a flexible, scalable security infrastructure to 
store and manage user profiles for user authentication and authorization. LDAP directory 
server allows both users and resource providers to collaborate and share information. We 
use LDAP server in our architecture for managing users’ ACs for large-scale applications. 
In our architecture, we use MyProxy server to store identity certificates for authentication, 
and build LDAP server to store attribute certificates for authorization. Then, using a
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standard web brow'ser, a user can comect to a grid portal and allow the portal to retrieve 
those certificates in order to access grid resources on behalf of the user. Section 4.3 
describes the three components in our proposed security architecture, and six basic steps 
for providing both authentication and authorization service. In this thesis, we address the 
second component of our security architecture, LDAP directory server, and provide 
details on how to design our schema for support of ACs and the deployment.
1.3.4 Impact
Our proposed architecture improves the security services of computational grids. It 
supports sharing authorization information of grid users. It also contributes to the 
scalability and delegation in grid environments. In addition, it can reduce administrative 
costs to resource providers and enable dynamic collaboration in grid computing.
Our approach significantly simplifies the management of access controls for large 
numbers of users because access decisions are based on a set of roles rather than a great 
number of individual users. In addition, role information is in form of digital certificate 
which can be distributed all over the world. It allows resource providers to share the 
authorization information of users and create collaborative environments, and may allow 
users to access multiple resources by using the same roles or different roles.
This architecture enable distributed resource providers to control their resources and 
specify access requirements flexibly. Resource providers can define their own access 
policy for various roles or attributes and can create or change any type of roles of a user. 
With this new approach and architecture, it is more secure and convenient for users to 
access and for resource providers to manage resources.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
TMs thesis presents both background and solutions to current problems in grid security 
area. It is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review about current grid 
security requirements, arcMtectures and policies. Chapter 3 introduces the related security 
technologies including public key infrastructure, SSL, RBAC and their limitations and 
advantages are discussed. Chapter 4 describes in more detail our proposed enhanced 
security architecture and technology used including AC and LDAP. Chapter 5 
concentrates on the design and deployment of LDAP server for our architecture. Chapter 
6 describes testing and evaluation for the proposed mechanism, features and limitation are 
also discussed. Chapter 7 concludes and discusses research issues for future work.
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2. GRID SECURITY
Computational grids demand advanced security mechanisms. TMs chapter covers the 
various aspects in the area of grid security. Section 2.1 describes grid security 
requirements including authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, single 
sign-on and delegation. Section 2.2 provides an overview of existing grid security 
architectures that satisfy these requirements. Section 2.3 introduces current representation 
approaches to security* policies on the resources.
2.1 Grid Security Requirements
Security in grid computing is complicated because there are many administrative 
domains. [Humphrey02] describes grid security requirements including authentication, 
authorization, integrity, and confidentiality. And there are some other important 
requirements such as single sign-on and certificate delegation.
2.1.1 Authentication
Authentication is the foundation of the security requirements in grids. It is used to 
guarantee that entities are who they claim to be. For each communication between two 
parties, both of them would like to prove the identity of each other and the origin of the 
information. There are many authentication technologies such as password-based 
authentication, public key certification, Kerberos, Secure Socket Library (SSL), Secure 
Shell (SSH) and biometric characteristics such as fingerprint, voice and retina! 
recognition. These approaches represent different strengths of authentication. People use 
them depending on the level of security required by their application systems.
User name and password is the traditional authentication method. Although it is very 
popular, there are some existing problems. Users frequently use simple passwords, so
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
passwords can be easily stolen, sniffed or guessed by dictionary tools or brute-force 
attacks [HayesOO]. And some passwords never expire; some password files are stored in 
clear text; and although the files are encrypted, many passwords are transmitted in clear 
text over the network. An unencrypted password is easily broken. “One-time password 
scheme” [HayesOO] provides authentication for unsecured networks. Passwords can be 
kept on a central system and requested by users. Because these passwords are used only 
once, they are better than conventional passwords.
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol and standard for security. It has been 
widely used since the mid-1980s [Foster98b]. Most research on it relies on conventional 
cryptography and on-line Authentication Server (AS)/Ticket-granting Server (TGS) 
[Kohl93]. Kerberos is a published standard and a single-sign-on technology, which 
permits users to log on once and access all authorized resources without re-entering 
password. The most important part of Kerberos is the Key Distribution Centre (KDC) that 
issues tickets for the user. The client and server should register their keys in advance on 
the KDC respectively. It includes two servers to perform key distribution. One is AS; the 
other is TGS. AS is responsible for issuing tickets for TGS, and TGS issues tickets for 
various servers and generates the shared secret key between client and server. Therefore, 
before a client communicates with a resource server, it should contact AS first. In 
addition, Kerberos can also implement cross-reahn authentication by designating 
trustworthy key servers in other organizations. But the Kerberos administrators have to 
set up agreements with another realm. This is often a lengthy and complex process 
[Thompson02a]. And it is infeasible for inter-site authentication because of equipment 
cost. Kerberos meets many security requirements for Grids, such as single sign-on and 
delegation [Kohl93]. However, Kerberos is more suitable for intra-site authentication 
because it always requires a centrally maintained key server for authentication [Butler99], 
while grids require inter-site authentication. Therefore, Kerberos is mostly used within a 
single administrative domain.
In grid computing, authentication technologies are for larger, dynamic, heterogeneous 
communities, and trust relationships will span multiple domains. Mutual authentication
10
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should be required to ensure that the sender and receiver are both authentic during the 
entire connection period. PKC and SSL are widely used and will be described in more 
detail in the following chapters.
2.1.2 Authorization
Authorization is based on authentication. It specifies what kind of operation is allowed for 
the user after the authentication. Authentication verifies identity, while authorization 
verifies privileges. The privileges for accessing grid resources may include reading or 
writing files, accessing database, running a program on a processing node, and so on. 
There are two authorization models: pull model and push model. Both models include the 
requestor, a request and a target resource, and they also provide an authorization decision.
(1) Authorization Pull Model
In the pull mode! (see Figure 2-1), a requestor sends a request to the resource, and then 
the resource sends a query to the authorization service for a decision. Finally, the 
authorization service evaluates the query against the policy and returns a response.
Requestor







Figure 2-1: Authorization Pull Model Showing Sequence of Operation (1) to (3)
11
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(2) Authorization Push Model
In push model (see Figure 2-2), the requestor first sends request to the authorization 
service. And then the authorization service returns a capability; it specifies all the 
permitted rights given to the requestor. The requestor then presents the capability to the 
resource. It is also called capability-based model. When the user wishes to access a 
resource, he needs to send this capability and his identity certificate together to the 
resource gatekeeper, the gatekeeper should verify that the subject named in the capability 
is the same as that in the identity certificate.







Figure 2-2; Authorization Push Model Showing Sequence of Operation (1) to (3) 
2.1.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is also called privacy. For a two-party communication, only the sender 
and receiver know the contents of the information. Encoding technique is used to provide 
confidentiality. Even if attackers steal the message, they can only see the garbled data and 
cannot understand it. Current technology includes public key cryptography and 
conventional cryptography.
12
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2.1.4 Integrity
Integrity ensures that only authorized parties are able to modify the information. TMs is 
used to prevent attackers from altering the informatioji. Data alteration includes insertion, 
deletion, substitution and replaying of transmitted messages. The technology for integrity 
uses one-way hash functions to protect original data. If the data is modified, the result of 
the hash fimction will be changed greatly, and then the receiver knows that the message 
has been modified.
2.1.5 Other Requirements
Currently grid security arcMtectures support virtual organizations through single sign-on 
and delegation.
Single sign-on is a service that a user can log on just once and then have access to any
resource without repeatedly entering his password. Now many standards consider single 
sign-on to be necessary for large-scale distributed security architectures [Parker95].
Delegation [Gasser90] [HowellOO] is an important operation in grid environments. It
means one entity grants the ability to act on its behalf to another entity. A user can submit 
a program with the ability to run on the user’s behalf. Then the program can access the 
resources instead of the user. Restricted delegation is used to conditionally delegate a
subset of the user’s rights. It can prevent malicious actions effectively and reduce some 
security problems in Grids. Delegation can be chained; one can delegate credentials to 
host A and then the process on host A can delegate credentials to host B.
2.2 Grid Security Architectures
A number of corporations, professional groups, and universities have developed 
frameworks and software in grid computing. The European Community is sponsoring a
13
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grid project for physics, earth and biology applications. In the United States, the National 
Technology Grid is building a computational grid infrastructure. There are some projects 
that have implemented the security for grid systems. Globus has been developed by the 
Argoime National Laboratory and the University of Southern California. GSI is part of 
this project and provides security services that support grids. Legion is an object-based 
grid operating system that provides secure infrastructure. CRISIS provides security for 
Web-OS. CAS is community authorization service, which separates resource 
administration from community administration and increases scalability.
2.2.1 Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [Foster98b] was developed as part of the Globus 
project and provides secure authentication and communication for grids. The Globus 
Toolkit provides software tools used to build computational grids and grid-based 
applications. GSI is used for inter-site security. It bridges the different local security 
solutions of each site. The GSI software is a set of libraries and tools that focuses on 
cross-domain authentication and message protection [Foster97b], single sign-on, and 
delegation mechanisms [Gasser90] [Hardjono94] [HowellOO], It is based on public key 
infrastructure, X.509 certificates, and uses SSL for its mutual authentication protocol. 
GSI includes several significant features: each entity including user, resource and 
program has a globally unique name [Butler99]. This name is included in X.509 identity 
certificate. A certification authority (CA) ties an identity to a public key by signing a 
certificate. An authentication algorithm is defined by the Secure Socket Layer Version 3 
(SSLvB) protocol. An entity can delegate a subset of its rights to a third party by creating 
a temporary identity called a proxy.
In the Grid environment, a user may be authenticated many times when accessing 
multiple resources. The user has to repeatedly type his pass phrase. The more times the 
user’s private key is exposed, the more chances it will be compromised. [NovotnyOl] 
proposed using proxy credentials to solve this problem. A proxy credential is a short-term 
credential in order to take place of long-term credential of the user. A proxy includes two
14
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parts: a new certificate (ha\ing a new public key) and a new private key. The new 
certificate contains the user's identity, and is indicated that it is a proxy. This proxy is 
signed by the user or by another proxy. During mutual authentication, the user's public' 
key is used to validate the signature on the proxy certificate. The CA's public key is then 
used to validate the signature on the user's certificate. This establishes a chain of trust 
beginning with the CA and first the user, then the user’s proxies.
The Globus infrastructure provides a gateway server at each site. The overview of the 
security in Globus is shown in Figure 2-3. The server on the client site verifies a user’s 
identity certificate and creates a temporary proxy certificate for the user. The server at the 
resource site authenticates the received certificate and maps the identity into a local user 
ID. There is one problem about the keys. The private keys are always stored on the local 
file systems without additional protection. It relies on file system access security provided 
by the host operating system.
1. Exchange certificates,
authenticate, delegate
2. Check gridmap file
3. Lookup service







Figure 2-3; Security Model in Globus
Grid computing builds dynamic, inter-domain, distributed computing environments. It is 
important for a program to be able to act on the user’s behalf on the Grid [NovotnyOlj. 
Globus has implemented certificate delegation. Single sign-on is also achieved through 
the use of proxy certificates. An entity may delegate a subset of its rights to a third party 
by creating a temporary identity proxy credential. It allows the user to delegate a proxy
15
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credential to processes or another entity on remote hosts. For example, if a user wants to 
collect more storage system on the grid by runnmg a program, he is required to 
authenticate Hmseif to different systems. After the user performs single sign-on using 
proxy, the program mnning on the user’s behalf can access the permitted resources. A 
proxy certificate is used to delegate the user’s authority for a very limited time period in 
order to authenticate on the user’s behalf to remote resources. The long-lived user 
credentials is only required at initial log-on when a proxy is created.
2.2.2 Online Credential Repository (MyProxy)
MyProxy is an online credentials repository system. [NovotnyOl] gives a detailed 
introduction on MyProxy. It describes the architecture and security of the MyProxy 
system in details. There are two problems about grid credentials [NovotnyOl]. One is that 
the grid credentials must be stored in file system and kept private, when a user wants to 
use his credentials he must log in a secure manner to the file system. So there is a 
problem for traveler users who is away from the file system. They must have a copy of 
their grid credentials in order to access Grid. MyProxy was designed to solve this 
problem. A user can store his credential on the MyProxy server. When the credential is 
needed the user connects to the server and allows MyProxy server to use the stored 
credential on his behalf. Therefore, it provides a more secure environment than the user’s 
home computer, and it also allow the user to use his credential when away from his home 
computer.
The other problem is that grid portals cannot integrate with GSI because web browser 
cannot support delegation, while GSI support delegation. MyProxy credential repository 
system can solve the incompatibility problem between web and grid security. It has a 
repository server and client tools used to delegate and retrieve credentials from the 
repository [NovotnyOl]. First, a user delegates a proxy to the MyProxy repository with 
user ID and pass phrase [ButlerOO]. Later, when the user needs his credentials, he uses a 
program to connect with the MyProxy repository with the same user ID and pass phrase, 
and can retrieve that user’s proxy. Then this proxy will be used to act on behalf of user on
16
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the grid. Therefore, MyProxy System permits users to access their credentials from 
anywhere and allows users to delegate credentials to resources. It also malces Grid Portals 
to access GSI protected resources [NovotnyOl]. In addition, using short-term proxy 
credentials can limit private key exposure, and is better than cop3dng long-term 
credentials to all the systems that the user may use.
Besides that, it provides many new fiinctions such as management of permanent 
credentials and automatic selection of credentials from multiple credentials [NovotnyOl]. 
It is also called a “credential wallet” [ButlerOO]. Users can put all their credentials for 
multiple sites into this “wallet”. When credentials are requested, the MyProxy server will 
automatically select which credential to delegate according to the user’s identity 
[ButlerOO],
2.2.3 LEGION
The Legion project at the University of Virginia is an object-based operating system for 
grids. The goal of the project is to create a system using principles from object-oriented 
programming, parallel processing, distributed computing, and computer security fields. It
is a software tool to provide a secure and high-performance infrastructure for grid 
computing.
Legion is object oriented. It uses object to represent the entities in grid such as hosts, files 
and programs. In Legion every object is identified by a unique Legion object ID, and each 
object is responsible for its own security policies. The system makes the resource 
provider has authority over the use of his resources. Legion provides a basic 
implementation of a public-key based policy. The security model is aimed at protecting 
objects and their communication. Data encryption and integrity services are available to 
messages passed between objects in Legion. The authentication in Legion uses object’s 
identifier and its public key. It also supports X.509-based certification. [StokerOl] Legion 
has a default security infrastructure [Ferrari99] based on access control lists. An ACL is
17
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associated with each object and lists all the operations that the principa! can run on the 
object.
Legion is similar to Giobus, but it focus on object-based software technologies for grid 
computing. It can provide more flexible security mechanisms. But Legion security model 
does not include actual architecture and protocols [Foster98b]. Legion is above the 
physical resources of the grid and below the application layer, so Legion is often called 
middleware.
2 .2.4 CRISIS
CRISIS is a security part of Web-OS. It provides wide area security, remote process 
execution, resource management, and distributed storage services. WebOS was developed 
at the University of California at Berkeley.
Web-OS is similar to Globus, while CRISIS is similar to GSI. It uses SSL and X.509 
certificates. The authorization in the CRISIS architecture uses both access control lists 
and a capability lists. The entity provides its identity plus its capabilities to the resource, 
and access decision is made by using the two lists with its identity and capabilities. 
[Foster98b] lists some difference between GSI and CRISIS. The resources in CRISIS 
don’t include process, while GSI includes process and allows it to request access to other 
resources. CRISIS is more suitable for Web architecture rather than grid computing.
CRISIS can be used in different administrative domains. Each domain has its own CA. If 
an entity from one domain wants to authenticate with a member of another domain, a trust 
path needs to be established between the two domains. [Belani98] describes the design, 
architecture and implementation of CRISIS. It uses transfer certificates as a simple 
mechanism to create roles and capabilities. It increased system security and performance 
across the wide area. The technique includes redundancy, caching, least privilege, and 
complete accountability. But the current implementation of CRISIS is only for Solaris.
18
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2.2.5 Community Authorization Service (CAS)
The Community Authorization Sender (CAS) [Pearlman02] is a new authorization service 
developed by the Globus Project for Grid environments. [PearlmanOZ] describes CAS 
architecture in detail. It provides a scalable mechanism for specifying community 
policies, and allows resource providers to delegate some of the authority for access 
conlTol. CAS builds on public key authentication and delegation mechanisms by GSI, it 
solves three authorization problems in distributed virtual organizations: scalability, 
flexibility and policy hierarchy [Pearlman02].
The CAS model is used to manage the assignment of privileges to users from several 
communities. CAS allows a resource provider to assign coarse-grained access rights for 
its resources. CAS uses three major extensions to GSI [Fearlman02]: restricted proxy 
credentials for delegation, a policy language for specifying the rights in the restricted 
proxy, and libraries and APIs. CAS uses the Generic Authorization and Access control 
API (GAA-API) [Ryutov98] [RyutovOO] and GSS API [Linn93] as its API. In CAS, 
checking the policy and granting the rights to the user is before contacting the gatekeeper 
[Thompson02a]. And CAS uses the centralized community policies to govern all the 
resources [Pearlman02]. A community uses CAS servers as a centralized trusted party 
within the community. CAS server can specify access policies for each community 
member. Users make requests to the resources using the CAS proxy credentials, and then 
resources grant access based on the access policy in resource and the community policy 
stated in the proxy credentials.
2.3 Security Policy Specificatioii Approaches
Many approaches on expressive languages for making and verifying security assertions 
[KomievskaiaOl] include FolicyMaker [Biaze96], and its successor KeyNote [Blaze99c], 
PONDER [DamianouOO], and SAML [Hallam02].
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2.3.1 PolicyMaker
Matt Blaze’s PolicyMaker [Blaze96] is the earliest system for distributed trust 
management [Kagal02a]. It is able to specify and interpret security policies about access 
rights. But the policy is a little complicated and not easy for non-programmers to use. The 
goal for PolicyMaker [Blaze96] [Blaze98] is putting all the policy and credential 
information into signed certificates that can be stored in a distributed way. PolicyMaker 
certificates are generalized and difficult to apply the access policy for a resource.
2.3.2 KeyNote
KeyNote [Blaze99c] is a trast-management system. It provides a language for describing 
and implementing security policy, trust relationship and credentials. The KeyNote defines 
principal including its public key. Authorization policy has some fields. Each field is 
represented by a keyword and value. A credential includes some attributes about a 
principal and is signed by a trusted authority. Assertions and credentials are both 
represented by the keyword policy language. The KeyNote system is on a C-like 
expression and regular syntax for describing conditions. KeyNote certificates are 
“assertion monotony” [Thompson99]. Each assertion can only increase the permitted 
actions and can not specify negatives.
23.3 PONDER
Ponder is an object-oriented language [DamianouOO] [DamianouOl] for specifying 
security policies and management policies. It uses role-based access control. [DulayOl] 
presents an overview of the types of policies specified with Ponder, and describes how an 
object implements a policy. It has four basic policy types: authorizations, obligations, 
refrains and delegations; and has three composite policy types: roles, relationships and 
management structures that are used to compose policies. The relationships between the 
various types are described in [DulayOl]. Ponder also supports abstractions policies
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definitioa.
Existing policy work has focused on specification and application-specific policy 
enforcement. [DulayOl] introduces using policies for tlie security and management of 
large-scale distributed networks, and describes a general-purpose deployment mode! for 
managing Ponder policies. In this model each policy type is represented by a policy 
object. The policy object maintains the state of the policy and manages ail policy 
operations. (See Figure 2-4) Then the policy object will invoke corresponding operations 
on its enforcement agents for the policies.
Policy/idministraiors








Figure 2-4; Ponder Policy Operations [DulayOl]
The model supports authorization and obligation policies using multiple access control 
mechanisms. Management policies define what actions can be performed under specific 
conditions. The Ponder policy specification language uses domains to group objects and 
the application of policies to domains. It defines objects for policies, for domains, and for 
policy agent.
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2.3.4 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
It is very difficult to express the constraints and trust relationships because there is too 
much information in relationships. XML has greater flexibility. Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) [Hallam02] has been published by the Organization for the 
Advancement of Stmctured Information Standards (OASIS). It is a XML standard 
specification for security assertions. This standard defines XML protocols and assertion 
structures. Assertions have three types: authentication, authorization and attribute. 
Authentication is the specified subject authenticated; Authorization Decision is permitting 
or denying a request to access the resource; Attribute specifies some attributes associated 
with the subject.
The SAML specification [WelchOS] defines a number of elements for making assertions 
and queries regarding authentication, authorization decisions and attributes. The Resource 
element is used to identify the target where the policy is being asserted. This element is 
simply a URJ. The Subject element contains identity information about the requestor. 
Assertion element can contain any number of conditions elements. Conditions elements 
are used to express restrictions on the validity time of the assertion. Each Evidence 
element can contain any number of assertions elements that affect the policy decision 
process. SAML defines three kinds of assertions. Authentication assertions require the 
user’s identity. Attribute assertions contain specific details about the user. The 
authorization decision assertion identifies what the user can do. SAML defines a message 
exchange between a policy enforcement point (PEP) and a policy decision point (PDF). A 
user sends an AuthorizationDecisionQuery to a server, and then the authorization server 
will evaluate the request according to the policy, and return Assertions containing either 
an AttributeStatement or an AuthorizationDecision. The message flow in SAML is shown 
in Figure 2-5.
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Figure 2-5; SAML Message Flow [Welch03]
SAML becomes the common language to defining how identity and access information 
exchanged. The SAML specification itself doesn't define any new technology for 
authentication. It only makes assertions about credentials and doesn't actually authenticate 
or authorize users. But it establishes assertion and protocol schemas for the structure of 
the documents.
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3. RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
This chapter introduces several critical security technologies which are related to the 
ideas in this thesis. Section 3.1 explains basic private key infrastructure and section 3.2 
provides background information on authentication mechanisms based on x.509 digital 
certificates. Section 3.3 introduces the features of widely used SSL protocol and explains 
how it works. Section 3.4 provides an overview of RBAC model.
3.1 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public-key cryptography is using asymmetric encryption, it makes use of a pair of keys: 
private key and public key. If using one key for encryption, we must use the other key for 
decryption. The two keys are linked together by way of a complex mathematical 
equation. The public key is published and known to anyone. It can be used to check the 
digital signature, while the private key is known only to its owner who should never 
reveal it. It can be used to create a digital signature. RSA algorithm is one of the most 
widely used public key algorithms which makes it impossible to deduce the private key 
from the public key. It is named after the inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len 
Adleman [HousleyOl].
If a message sender wishes to use public-key technology to encrypt a message to a 
recipient, the sender needs a copy of the recipient’s public key. When a party wishes to 
verify a digital signature generated by another party, the verifying party needs a copy of 
the public key of the signing party. The two operations are different: signing and 
encrypting messages. To encrypt a message with recipient’s public key make sure that 
only the recipient can decrypt it and read the message. To sign a message with signer’s 
private key proves that the message is indeed sent from the signer. People can check a 
digital signature in order to verify the identity of the person who signed the message. 
Digital signature is a cryptographic transformation of data. It provides the services of
24
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origin autiienticatioii and data integrity.
In a PKI [Thompson99], all entities are identified by a globally unique name called a 
Distinguished Name (DN) in the certificate. Entities prove their identity using grid 
credentials consisting of a certificate and the private key. According to [Thompson99], 
PKI identity certificates are more widespread than Kerberos identities.
3.2 X.509 Public Key Certificate (PKC)
From remote operations on grid resources, security remains a major issue. The access 
control by username and password is not enough because most information is transmitted 
in clear text on the Internet. To control the access by combining the use of the password 
and the digital certificate is safer. Many companies become aware of this reality and the 
digital certificates have been widely used in the Internet. ITU (International 
Telecommunication Union) and ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 
published the X.509 standard in 1988, which has been adopted by IETF (International 
Engineering Task Force). X.509 is the data format for public-key certificates.
A pair of keys is not enough to associate with an identity; the association is done by 
digital certificate that associates the public key with an identity. A digital certificate 
makes it possible to check that somebody has the right to use a key, thus helping to 
prevent that a person uses a fake key to appear as someone else. An X.509 public key 
certificate (PKC) as defined by [HousleyOl] includes a public key, a subject name and a 
validity period. It is signed by a trusted third party called a Certification Authority (CA). 
A PKC binds a name and a public key. Due to this specific binding PKC can be used for 
authentication. These certificates are also called "identity certificates" [Thompson02b] 
which is used to securely identify an entity. The format of X.509 PKC is shown in 
Figures-1. Digital Certificates are based on the public key infrastructure. The link 
between the public key and the individual is certified by CA.
25
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Figure 3-1: X.509 Public Key Certificate Format
Certificate Authority (CA) is a recognized authority trusted by one or more parties. It can 
create and sign Public Key Certificates, and also revoke certificates it has issued. CA also 
manages a certificate revocation list (CRL). A grid CA is defined in [Thompson02b], it is 
independent of any single organization and it is used to sign certificates for individuals 
who are allowed access to the grid resources. Every node in the network needs to know 
the public keys of the CAs it trusts because the CAs’ public keys are used to verify CAs’ 
signatures. The user interface of trusted CAs and one of CA certificates are shown in 
Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2; User Interface of Trusted CAs and CA’s Certificate
A certificate binds an identity of the holder to the public key. So it is used to verify that a 
given public key does belong to a given individual. Every user and service on the grid is 
identified via a certificate. Revocation of certificates becomes an issue if the private key 
of an entity is compromised. Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are distributed regularly 
to all nodes. A node should check the revocation list to make sure the certificate is still 
valid before accepting it. Therefore, during the certificate verification, first check its 
expiration dates, revocation list, and if the certificate is signed by trusted CA. If it passes 
all the checks, then the public keys will be used to build a handshake to prove that the 
certificate holder has the corresponding private key. Passing all these tests, a secure 
connection has established between the two parties.
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In summar> ,̂ the certificates can provide confidentiality by encrypting messages. It can 
also provide integrity, authentication and non-repudiation by digital signature. 
Certificates are used to prove the identity of the sender and to make sure that the message 
was not altered by anybody. Most important, it can provide access control to Internet sites, 
Intranets or other networks. Grid computing requires mutual authentication, so the two 
parties need send their certificates to the other in order to confirm the identity to each 
other.
33 Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was originally developed by Netscape, and now has 
become security protocol and authentication too! used in web browsers and web servers. 
The SSL protocol runs above TCP/IP and below higher-level protocols such as HTTP or 
LDAP. Since the protocol operates at the transport layer, any program that uses TCP can 
use SSL connections. SSL protocol provides a secure means for establishing an encrypted 
communication. It uses PKI credentials for authentication and supports numerous 
encryptions and digest mechanisms. SSL comes in two strengths, 40-bit and 128-bit, 
which refer to the length of the "session key" generated by every encrypted transaction. 
The longer the key, the more difficult it is to break the encryption code.
The SSL protocol includes two sub-protocols: the SSL record protocol and the SSL 
handshake protocol. The SSL record protocol defines the format of transmitted data. The 
SSL handshake protocol defines exchanging messages between server and client during 
establishing an SSL connection. This exchange of messages include the following actions:
e Authenticate the server to the client.
« Allow the client and server to select the cryptographic algorithms that they both 
support.
• Optionally authenticate the client to the server.
• Use public-key encryption techniques to generate shared secrets 
® Establish an encrypted SSL connection.
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The SSL protocol uses both public-key and symmetric key encryption to establish 
encrypted communication. Symmetric key encryption is much faster than public-key 
encryption, but public-key encryption provides better authentication techniques. An SSL 
session always begins with an exchange of messages called the SSL handshake. The 
handshake allows the server to authenticate itself to the client using public-key 
techniques, and then allows the client and the server to create symmetric keys used for 
rapid encryption during the foliowing communication. SSL uses X.509 certificates. 
Server certificates provide a way for users to authenticate the identity of a server.
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Figure 3-3: Server Authentication using SSL (Basic Four Steps)
Figure 3-3 illustrates the four basic steps during authenticating a server's identity by a 
client. First step, the client checks the server certificate's validity period. If the current 
date is invalid, the authentication process will inform the client. Second step, checks the 
distinguished name (DN) of the issuing CA matches the DN on the eiienf s trust CA list.
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Each client should maintain a list of trasted CA certificates. This list determines which 
server certificates the client will accept. Third step, the client uses the public key from the 
CA’s certificate in its trusted list to validate the CA's digital signature on the server 
certificate. If the CA's digital signature can be validated, then the ser/er certificate is 
valid. Fourth step, check if the domain name in the server's certificate match the domain 
name of the current server, which confirms that the server is actually located at it own 
network address. This step can protect against Man-in-tlie-Middle attack.
SSL protocol provides authentication, message integrity and message confidentiality. It 
uses digital certificates to encrypt the data to keep it safe from interception. And it can 
prevent tampering. SSL will generate a warning if the information is changed between the 
server and the client. It also supports mutual authentication [KomievskaiaOl]. If SSL is 
configured in the server to require client side authorization, then mutual authentication is 
performed [Thompson99]. The client must send its credentials to the server to confirm the 
identity of the user. Client authentication can protect against user impersonation.
3.4 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
One of the most challenging problems is managing users in large networks. Access 
control is needed to control the operations of legitimate users in order to protect the stored 
information. The effectiveness of access control systems can be measured on two criteria: 
reliability of security and ease of administration. Role based access control (RBAC)
attracts more attention because it reduces the complexity and cost of security 
administration in large networked applications.
3.4.1 Access Control List (ACL)
Traditional security administration uses access control lists for each user on the system 
individually. Access control list (ACL) is used to perform authorization. It contains 
information of both identity of the users and the name of the programs to be run. ACL is 
based on operating system, where all access rights for each authenticated entity are listed.
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It establishes specific permissions for each user for access controL This approach is 
effective in a static environment, but it is very difficult to manage in dynamic grid 
environments which may require frequent adding new users and updating of access 
permissions. The maintenance of those ACLs requires a lot of effort. Additionally, if 
people wish to grant users access some specific resource for a short period of time the 
















Figure 3-4: Access Control List (ACL) Schema
There are several other problems about using ACLs. First, a central administrator is
required and must be trasted; second, all the users who wish to share the resource must 
have a local account on the system in advance [Thompson02a]; third, it is difficult to 
maintain applications and difficult to scale; fourth, users have to require separate ACLs 
for each system. Figure 3-4 describes the ACL schema, and each server should have an 
ACL for storing the name of users who can access this server. Therefore, it is not suitable 
for grid environments.
3.4.2 MBAC Model
With RBAC, each user is assigned one or more roles, and each role is assigned one or 
more privileges. In RBAC model [Sandhu96], it includes three sets of entities called users, 
roles and permissions. A user is a human being. A role is the basis of access control
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policy. It represents the authority and responsibility of a job position in the organization. 
Roles can be set up based on locations, projects and management level. Permission is 
authorized actions on particular targets. With RBAC, system administrators can create 
roles, grant permissions to those roles, and then assign users to the roles on the basis of 
their specific job responsibilities and policy. In particular, role-permission relationships 
can be predefined, making it simple to assign users to the predefined roles.
Access control policy is embodied in RBAC components such as user-role, role- 
permission, and role-role relationships. These RBAC components determine if a 
particular user is allowed access to a specific piece of system data. The relationship 
among them such as user-role and role-permission is shown in Figure 3-5. A user can be 
assigned many roles, and a role can be given to many users, so it is many-to-many 
relationship. A role can be assigned many permissions, and a permission can also be 
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Figure 3-5 j Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Model
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Access decisions are based on the roles of the users, rather than the individual users. 
Permissions associated with a role are better than permissions associated with a user 
because users always change their job, but a role's permissions are seldom changed 
[Sandhu96]. And users can be easily reassigned to different roles when they change the 
jobs.
Role-based access control (RBAC) is suitable for managing and enforcing security in 
large-scale systems. It has proved to be a successful technology in security 
infrastructures. There are some advantages of RBAC as follows:
1. Flexible access control model. An administrator using RBAC can easily register
and revoke the user’s role membership based on the user’s jobs. In addition, 
users may be able to use the same role across multiple systems.
2. Simplifies security management. Roles can be updated without updating the 
rights for each user. Therefore, it enables access control maintenance easier. It 
can simplify the allocation and removal of privileges. When accessing a target, a 
user presents his role, and the target reads the policy to see if this role is allowed 
to perform this action. By removing the role from the original role holder, his 
privileges are automatically removed. Many people can hold the same role, and 
have the same set of privileges.
3. Reduces administrative cost. The efficiency and cost savings come from the need
for maintaining a RBAC system, which grants users access rights based on their 
role rather than their individual identity.
4. Scalability. There are typically far fewer roles than participants. The number of
participants in each role can run into the thousands or more. RBAC makes it 
easier to administer the privileges to a limited number of roles, and also simpler 
to allocate roles to the large numbers of users. Therefore, RBAC supports
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scalability in both users and privileges which may dynamically change in grid 
environments.
5. Greater security. It prevents users from obtaining inconsistent privileges that can
enable access violations. All the users who belong to the same role will have the 
same privileges. In addition, it separates the duties, which can constrain role 
allocation. An individual cannot occupy mutually exclusive roles.
6. Privilege inheritance. Role hierarchies can be defined. Junior roles appear at the
bottom of the hierarchic structure and senior roles are at the top. The superior 
roles inherit the privileges of the subordinate roles, and also have their own 
additional privileges. Hierarchical RBAC allows role specifications to be easier, 
since a superior role does not need to enumerate the privileges it has inherited 
from its subordinate roles.
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4. PROPOSED ENHANCED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In order to control access to grid resource, both authentication and authorization are 
required. Most research in security area always focuses on authentication techniques 
including digital signatures, Public Key Infrastructures and public key certificates. Our 
research focuses on authorization technique based on attribute certificates in order to 
solve the problems of MyProxy online credential repository.
In grid environment, it is necessary to have a flexible, scalable security infrastructure to 
store and manage user profiles for user authentication and authorization. Directories will 
allow people to collaborate and share information both intemally and externally. With the 
feature, we use LDAP server in our architecture for managing users’ ACs for large-scale
applications.
In section 4.1, we introduce attribute certificates contents and its benefits in details, and 
also give a comparison between PKC and AC. Section 4.2 provides information on LDAP 
protocol and why we use it in our architecture. Section4.3 describes the three components 
in our proposed security architecture, and six basic steps for providing both authentication 
and authorization service.
4.1 Attribute Certificate (AC)
Attribute certificates were introduced by Intemational Standardization Organization in 
1997. An attribute certificate (AC) is an X.509 certificate which is similar to a PKC, 
However, an attribute certificate does not contain a public key, but contains attributes or 
other authorization information. AC binds attribute information to the certificate’s subject.
Attribute certificate is a means for authorization. It uses PKI in an authentication system 
to support authorization facilities, and is used to make authorization decisions and
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delegate role-related attributes. It can separate attribute management from identity 
management which means can separate authentication and authorization when required. 
Attribute certificates are issued by an Attribute Authority (AA), while identity certificates 
are issued by a Certification Authority (CA).
There are two forms of attribute certificates described as follows:
• One form is the attribute certificate which is included in the extensions to identity 
certificate when the AA and CA of the two certificates are same. There are some 
benefits for using this method such as requiring fewer entities, simplifying 
certification path and improving the interoperability with existing systems.
® Another form is separating attribute certificate fi'om identity certificate. So CA is 
used for authentication and AA is for authorization. Especially when the 
authorization information is often required to change, using separated attributed 
certificate is very convenient for updating. And most identity certificate is long­
term used while attribute certificate is short valid period.
The format of an attribute certificate is shown in Figure 4-1. An attribute certificate 
comprises the common information like subject-name (distinguished name of the 
certificate holder), issuer name (distinguished name of the attribute authority), unique
serial number, version number, validity period, and the algorithm used to sign this AC. 
Besides that, an attribute certificate also includes attribute information like group 
membership, roles or rights of access in certificates. A user can have multiple attribute 
certificates for different roles. Delegation is supported through the basic attribute 
constraints extension. This extension holds an integer that indicates the depth of 
delegation. Zero indicates no delegation, and one indicates one level of delegation. It is 
possible to manage access attributes in a flexible and scalable manner by using this 
approach.
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Figure 4-1: Attribute Certificate Format
A public key certificate (PKC), also called identity certificate, is used for authentication 
and binds a holder's name with his public key, and it is an authentication-oriented 
credential. While attribute certificate binds a holder's name with one or more privilege 
attributes, and it is an authorization-oriented credential. The comparison between them is 
described in Table 1. A PKC is like a passport because it is used to identify the holder and 
the valid period is long-lived. However, an AC is like an entry visa because it is short­
lived and used to get the permission. In addition, an AC is issued by an Attribute 
Authority (AA), while an PKC is issued by a Certification Authority (CA). So a CA is 
used for authentication and an AA is for authorization. The requirements for being a CA 
is very high and the process is complex, but anyone holding privileges can be an AA and 
be allowed to issue attribute certificates to others. This also facilitates delegation of user’s 
rights. Therefore, when the authorization information is often required to change, using 
separated certificate is very convenient for updating because the AC is short valid period.
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Aiithentication Authorization
Certificate Name Public Key Certificate (PKC) Attribute Certificate (AC)
Certificate Issuer Certification Authority (CA) Attribute Authority (AA)
Certificate Receiver Subject Holder
Binding Mformation Subject’s Name to Public Key Holder’s Name to Privilege 
Attributes
V alidity period Long-lived Short-lived
Key Required With Public Key Without Public Key
Table 1: A Comparison between PKC and AC
Authorization is always based on authentication. A PKC is used to identify a user while 
an AC is used to define the role of the user and grant the user access rights and privileges. 
So before using attribute certificate to do the authorization, identity certificate that 
includes public key is used to authenticate the subject first. An AC and a PKC can be 
bound together by associating the AC’s holder with FKC’s serial number or the subject 
name. The relationship between them is shown in Figure 4-2.
Public Key Certificate (PKC) 
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Figure 4-2: Binding PKC and AC
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4.2 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is the Internet standard for searching 
information in directory, just like the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the Internet 
standard for delivering documents. It was developed by the University of Michigan and 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). LDAP is defined by RFC 1777 and RFC 
2251 and is a standard protocol that operates over TCP/IP. It creates a standard way for 
applications to request and manage directory information. Directory service plays an 
important role in providing access to information at any time from anywhere across the 
world. Many companies store user information in an LDAP server which can be used by 
Web servers, mail servers, and other applications.
LDAP provides access to complex X.500 directories at a low-cost way. The X.500 
standards proved to be cumbersome, LDAP avoids large overhead of the X.500 Directory 
Access Protocol (DAP). LDAP server simply accessed an X.500 directory service using 
the OSI model and returned the information to the LDAP client. The relationship between 
LDAP and X.500 server is shown in the Figure 4-3. LDAP bridges the gap between users 
and global directories, and provides the means for users on any computer to access X.500 









Figure 4-3: Relationship Between LDAP and X.500 Server
LDAP focuses on how information was stored and accessed in a large directory or 
multiple directories. It not only provides the hierarchal information structure but also
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allows the directory to be accessed. Directories are set up in a hierarchy stractnre, it 
begins with a global name called Distinguished Name (DN) such as a organization name 
and goes down into more detail such as an Organizational Unit (OU), to a Common Name 
(CN) and finally an attribute type and attribute value. This facilitates the storage of the 
data. It is also easy to use access control and policies to each category. In the 
representation of distinguished names of the X.500 Directory system, several unique 
keywords may be necessary. [Zeilenga02] standardizes a set of strings for some attribute 
types that can be used in the LDAP encoding of X.500 distinguished names. Those strings 











Table 2; Directory System Name
Directories make enterprise information available to multiple different systems. The most
common information stored in a directory service is about user identity and related 
information. In order to retrieve the infomiation, directory access protocol is used to send 
the entries from directory server. When an LDAP client needs a specific entry in an 
LDAP server, the LDAP client generates an LDAP message containing a request and 
sends it to the LDAP server. The server retrieves the entry from its database and sends it
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back to the client. LDAP also allows using universal resource locators (URLs) to conduct 
directory lookups.
4.3 Proposed Security Architecture
There are many situations requiring both authentication and authorization. For example, 
there may be an application server that provides all kinds of source code for developers, 
say students and professors at university. Everyone who wants to use the code must be 
verified for his identity. This procedure is called authentication. In addition, each user has 
different permissions or rights. For example, undergraduate students may only access 
some basic level code for helping their studying programming; graduate students can 
access high level code for helping their research and permit to add new code into the 
database of the application server; and professors may not only access any level code but 
also can execute the code on the server. This procedure is called authorization. Different 
user may be permitted to do different things after the authentication.
MyProxy is a credential repository for the Grid. It allows users to delegate credentials to 
resources. But it supports only authentication without authorization. We propose a new 
architecture for support of MyProxy by concentrating on both authentication and 
authorization for grid systems. This architecture enables distributed resource providers to 
control their resources and specify access requirements flexibly.
An attribute certificate (AC) extends authentication-oriented public-key infrastructures 
(PKI) to support authorization facilities. Attributes in AC include authorization 
information about AC holder such as role, title or group membership. In particular, it can 
be used to delegate role-related attributes within distributed computing environments,
minimizing unnecessary trust in intermediaries.
The proposed architecture using attribute certificate and LDAP directory server is shown 
in Figure 4-4. We have three major components:
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1. MyProxy online credential repository. Users will delegate their identity proxy 
certificates into MyProxy repository. In our architecture, we will use it to do the 
delegation and authentication with their identity credentials. And it can also provide 
single sign-on without any further intervention by users.
2. LDAP directory server. LDAP provides easier and more secure access to grid 
resources. It provides a method to manage and distribute information in a low cost, 
allows information in the LDAP directory can be made available to other computer 
systems. We use it to store users’ attribute certificates which can be retrieved later to 
do authorization.
3. Grid portal. Grid portal is at the top of the layer for grids. It can facilitate the execution
of programs on remote resources through a web-based interface. In our architecture, 
grid portal will provide both authentication and authorization service using identity 
certificates and attribute certificates.
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Figure 4-4; Proposed Enhanced Security Architecture
There are six basic steps (see Figure 4-4) for achieving both authentication and
authorization service in our architecture as follows:
1. A user delegates a proxy identity certificate to the MyProxy repository with user ID 
and pass phrase. The user may specify the lifetime of credentials.
2. The user uploads attribute certificates to LDAP server.
3. Using a standard web browser, the user can connect to a Grid portal and allow the 
portal to contact MyProxy and LDAP server. And he must provide the same username 
and pass phrase to the portal.
4. MyProxy delegates proxy identity certificates to the portal on behalf of the user.
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5. Grid portal will connect with the LDAP server, and send a request to retrieve the 
user’s attribute certificates,
6. Grid portal will use these credentials to access grid resources on the user’s behalf. 
Proxy identity certificate will be used to act on behalf of user for authentication and 
those attribute certificates will be used for authorization for various local resources in 
distributed areas. After authentication, the service provider will check user access 
rights information in the attribute certificates. If the user has rights to access service 
resources, the service provider will permit user to access them and establish service 
sessions. And before using attribute certificate to do the authorization, identity 
certificate that includes public key is used to authenticate the subject. And most 
important of all, the subject in the two certificates should be same.
Authorization infomiation can be added into attribute certificates. Resource providers 
define their own access policies for various attributes. Distributed certificates can 
implement decentralized administration of resources. Attribute certificates are signed by 
authorities who are responsible for providing attribute information of users. An attribute 
comprises a type and a value. A role is just one type of attribute. Attribute certificates 
(ACs) are certified by an Attribute Authority (AA). If anyone trusts the A A, then he 
should trust the attributes specified in the AC which is issued by this AA. When a user 
sends request to access a resource, the system first authenticates the user with X.509 
identity certificate, then makes access decisions with his attribute certificates. Therefore, 
our proposed architecture can make use of the online credential repository to build 
authentication, delegation and attribute based access control together to provide better 
security for grid system.
The proxy certificates stored in MyProxy repository in their current version cannot be 
limited except for validity period, so users have to delegate all rights to other entity. In 
our mechanism attribute certificates (AC) can be used to delegate specific access rights. 
The resource provider will issue an attribute certificate to that user. The AC certifies that 
a set of rights has been assigned to the specific user, and then the user can use this 
attribute certificate and his identity proxy certificate to access the resource.
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In our proposed architecture, after a successM authentication for a user with MyProxy, 
the grid portal gets the user’s role information from LDAP server. The LDAP sender 
stores the user’s attribute certificates that include Ms role assignment information. The 
grid portal contains resources that require particular roles to be accessed. Grid portal will 
allow or deny users to access the resources by using their ACs which are embedded with 
roles.
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5. DEPLOYMENT
In this thesis, we address the second component of our security architecture, LDAP 
directory server, and provide details on how to deploy it. In section 5.1, we describe the 
installation, configuration and design for building our LDAP sender, and also introduce 
how to design our schema and directory tree. Section 5.2 provides information on 
creating ACs and adding them onto LDAP server.
5.1 Building LDAP Server
5.1.1 Installation and Configuration
We use Sun One Directory Server 5.2 to build our own LDAP server because it is able to 
deploy extensible and secure global directory services. Moreover, it supports a wide 
variety of standards such as X.509 v3, LDAP URLs (RFC 2255), LDAP v3 (RFC 2251), 
LDIF (RFC 2849) and SSL. Sun One Directory Server 5.2 supports a large number of 
entries which can provide scalability for our system. Users can access the online services 
whenever they need them. In addition, we can use access management and security tools 
to manage users and the policies controlling their privileges. Most important, it supports 
digital certificates.
Sun One Directory Server 5.2 can be downloaded from Sun Website: 
http://www.sun.com/software/download/. We installed Sun One Server on the Windows 
2003 Server, and our host system has a static IP address: 137.207.234.121. First, we 
obtain a naming service and the domain name for our host, and then we use the
information in Table 3 for our installation.
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I Administration domain







Directory Manager DN cn=Director}f Manager
Directory Manager password 1 -******** (8 characters)
 ̂ ■ ■ \
Directory Server port number 1 389 (default LDAP)
1
Fully qualified host distinguished name
i
j kent8.galab.uwindsor.ca
Server ID ! kentS
Server suffix
—
C''= lalab, dc=uwmdsor, dc=ca
ServerRoot (software installation directory) 1 C:\Program Files\Sun\MPS
1
Table 3; Installation information for Directory Server
The configuration infomation for directory server is stored as LDAP entries in the 
directory itself. Therefore, changing the configuration information is required using the 
server rather than by changing configuration files. It allows a directory administrator to 
reconfigure the server when it is running, and need not shut it down. The Configuration 
Directory stores information about how Directory Server itself is configured. The 
d s e . l d i f  file contains all the configuration information of directory server. The default 
configuration is stored as LDAP entries under the subtree cn=conf ig. When the server is 
started, the contents of the cn=config subtree are read from a file d se . ld i f .  This 
directory is generally installed first, and every subsequent server registers with it. It is 
required to set access permissions for the configure files serverRootiadmin- 
serv\config\adm.conf. This can prevent unauthorized users from modifying
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Administratioa Server configuration data.











The cn=config entry is an instance of the nssiapdconfig object class, which is inherits 
from extensibleObj ect obJcct claSS. The value of attribute nsslapd-schemacheck is on, 
which makes schema checking turn on. The access logging is also turned on. nsslapd- 
enquote-sup-oc is used to enable superior object class en-quoting which controls whether 
quoting in the objectciasses attributes. It should conform to the quoting specified by 
internet draft RFC 2252.
Figure 5-1 shows the main interface of Sun One directory server 5.2 which is configured 
and started.
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Figure 5-1: Sun One Directory Server 5.2 Interface
5.1.2 Schema Design
We design the contents of our directory server according to various types of data stored in 
it. The user directory stores entries for users who access directory services. The user 
directory is generally unique to the network domain. The directory schema determines the 
characteristics of the data stored in the directory.
While the object classes and attributes in the Directory Server do not meet our needs for 
ACs, a given object class does not permit us to store ACs information. So we extend the 
schema to support the object classes and attributes we need. We add 
“attributeCertificateAttribute” attribute and “pmiUser” object class into our LDAP 
schema in order to support storing and retrieve ACs.
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Directory Server bases its schema format on version 3 of the LDAP protocol (LDAPvB). 
Schema includes two parts: attributes and object classes. When adding new schema 
elements, all attributes need to be defined before they can be used in an object class. 
Attributes and object classes can be defined in the same schema file. We can modify the 
schema with the command line tools. This is because the schema is stored as a regular 
entry. The schema for Directory Server is in the entry named cn=schema. But we have to 
authenticate as the Directory Server Manager, and then the schema content can be read or 
change by setting base to the DN of "cn-schema". subschemaSubentry is DN of the 
entry that contains schema information. This attribute is defined in RFC 2252 and present 
for every entry in the directory such as subschemaSubentry: cn=schema, syntax is DN; 
Object Identifier (OID) is 2.5.18.10; single-valued. attributeTypes specifies the 
attribute types used within a subschema. Each value describes a single attribute. Syntax is 
attribute types syntax; OID is 2.5.21.5; multi-valued.
The attributeCertificateAttribute is defined in [ITUOl]. It is used to hold the attribute 
certificates of a user. The LDAP specific encoding for values of this attribute is described 
as follows:
attributeCertificateAttribute ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX AttributeCertificate
EQUALITY M ATCHING RULE attributeCertificateExactMatch
ID  { joint-iso-ccitt( 2 )  ds(5) attributeType(4) 
attributeCertificate(58) } }
The corresponding LDAP description is
( 2 . 5 . 4 . 5 8  NAME 'attributeCertificateAttribute'
EQUALITY attributeCertificateExactMatch 
SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.5 )
The LDAP uses Basic Encoding Rules (BER) as encoding method for an X.509 attribute 
certificate. The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax:
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.5 DESC 'Attribute Certificate' )
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We add a new attribute called “attributeCertificateAttxibiite” into our LDAP schema 
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Figure 5-2: Adding Attribute for AC into LDAP Schema 
PMI Object Classes
PMI directory object classes [ITUOl] is described as follows:
pmiUser OBJECT-CLASS ::= { -- a privilege holder 
SUBCLASS OF {top}
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KIND auxiliary
MAY CODJYAIH {attributeCertificateAttribute}
ID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) objectclass (6) pmiUser (24) } }
We add a new object class called “pmiUser” into our LDAP schema using the following 
information. Figure 5-3 shows this new object class.
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Figure 5-3: Adding PMI Object Class to LDAP Schema
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5.1.3 Directory Tree Design
LDAP uses a hierarchical tree as a data structure. The directory tree is also known as a 
directory information tree (DIT). There is a single root node that is called root suffix. It 
has some subordinate nodes called subentries. A node is a directory entrŷ  with some 
attributes.
A LDAP entry is basic record in the LDAP directory. It includes attributes and values. 
Each entry has a special attribute called the distinguished name, which is the unique name 
of the entry. A Distinguished Name must be unique in the LDAP namespace. Its 
components must be part of the LDAP entry. A distinguished name (DN) is always 
indexed and will always be returned in any search. A DN is the string representation of 
the name of an entry in an LDAP directory, and it also describes a path to a directory 
entry. Each DN is made up of a number of components called relative distinguished 
names (RDNs). Each RDN identifies a specific entry in the directory. A single parent 
entry cannot have two identical RDNs below it. A DN always contain three types of RDN:
• A user name, user ID, or group name (identified by the cn or u id  keyword)
• An organization name (identified by the o keyword)
® One or more domain name components (identified by the dc keyword)
The base of the tree can use the DomamClass (dc) as the root attributes. The dc is then 
based upon the domain name. Our domain name is “galab.uwindsor.ca”, so our base dn 
could be "dc=galab, dc=uwindsor, dc=ca". The directory tree makes our directory data to 
be named and referred by client applications. The directory tree design involves choosing 
a suffix to contain our data, determining the hierarchical relationship amongst data entries, 
and naming the entries in the tree.
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Creating a Suffix
The suffix is the name of the m try  at the root of the tree. We store all our directory data 
under it. Our Directory Server deployment contains multiple suffixes, one for storing data 
and the others for internal directory operations such as configuration information and 
directory schema. Sub suffix is a branch under the root suffix.
We creating a new root suffix c=CA from Directory Server console. First, using 
Configuration tab and data field to choose “New suffix”, then enter a suffix name c=CA 
in the Suffix DN field. The name must use the distinguished name format. The location of 
database files for this suffix is chosen automatically by the server. After the new root 
suffix was created, we logged in as the directory manager using cn=Directory Manager 
and the password of it. Then we select the New Root Object to create the new root suffix 
c=CA on the root node of the directory tree, and select an object class for the root object 
c=country. Finally we can use the generic editor to edit it.
Creating Directory Tree Structure
The design of data hierarchy can optimize the entry grouping and attribute management. 
Figure 5-4 shows our directory tree design. It includes four levels. First is country name, 
second is organization name, the third level can be organization unit or specific person, 
the fourth level is the end users who belong to various organization units.
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Figure 5-4: Directory Information Tree (DIT) Design















Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Creating Entries with New Object Class and Attribute
We create an entry with new object class we have defined in the directory schema 
because they are not in the default list. First, use Directory tab and expand the directory 
tree to find the parent of the new entry, and then select the “New Other item”. In the 
object class list of the New Object dialog, select the object class that defines our new 
entry. Figure 5-5 shows how to add the pmiUser object class in our entry cn=user5, 
ou=Applicaiton, o=CodeNet, c=CA. When creating a new entry, the generic editor 
contains a field for each required attribute of the object class we selected. And most 
important, we must add the new attributes that are involved in the new object class using 
add attribute dialog and generic editor. Figure 5-6 shows the new attribute has been added 
into the entry cn=userO, o=CodeNet, c=CA. Then the new entry is displayed as a child 
of that parent entry we have selected in the directory tree.
The generic editor allows us to see the attributes of an entry and edit them such as adding 
and removing attributes, and manage the object classes of the entry. The object classes of 
an entry are defined by the multi-valued objectclass attribute. We can use generic 
editor to manage our defined object classes. Figure 5-5 shows how to add an object class 
to an entry. First, select the objectclass attribute, and then using Add Value button to 
get a list of object classes that we can add to the entry. If this button is not activated, we 
do not have permission to modify this entry's object class. The object classes we selected 
appear in the list of values for the objectclass attribute.
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Figure 5-5; Creating Entry with Adding new Object Class
Before we can add an attribute to an entry, the entry must contain an object class that
allows the attribute. We add an attribute to an entry using generic editor. Select Add 
Attribute button to get a dialog with a list of attributes. This list contains only attributes 
that are allowed by the object classes defined for the entry. In the Add Attribute dialog, 
select the one or more attribute we wish to add. we may select subtypes including 
language subtype and binary subtype. When an attribute value is binary data, we will set 
the binary subtype to this attribute such as attributeCertificateAttribute. Figure 5-6 shows 
the attributeCertificateAttribute has been added into the entry.
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Figure 5-6: Creating Entry with Adding AC attribute
We can also add one or more entries to the directory by using the “Idapmodify”. The 
Idapmodify utility is used to create each entry as follows:
Idapmodify -a -h kentS.galab.uwindsor.ca -p 389





description: Container for user entries
dn:cn=user5,ou=Applicaiton,o=CodeNet,c=CA
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We use “cn=Directory Manager” to create these entries because this account has the 
permission to perform any actions on entries, and -d and -w options give the bind DN 
and password. The ~a option makes all entries will be added. Then each entry is given 
by its DN and its attribute values, and there is a blank line between each entry. The 
LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) of an entry lists the attributes in the following 
order:
• The list of object classes.
• The naming attribute used in the DN (optional).
® The list of required attributes for all object classes.
« The list of optional attributes for the entry.
5.1.4 Access Control for LDAP Server
Access control was one of the important issues of any server. There are several 
mechanisms to accomplish the authentication using a distinguished name (DN) in the 
directory. This distinguished name is used to determine the access for the user. 
Associating a distinguished name v/ith a user is called binding. A user can bind to a 
server using the DN and a password, or they can bind anonymously.
We use the access control information (AC!) rules to perform access control for our 
LDAP server. It specifies the LDAP object, the users who are permitted access, and what
permission is being allowed. The directory manager has the highest rights to access and
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manage the directory. If there is no access control infomiation, the new directory can not 
be read by any user. The basic format of the ACI is as follows:
{target="Idap:///dn”){targetattr=”attrname")
[{targetfilter="rfc2254-style filter")]
( version 3.0; acl "name”; (allow | deny)
(read, write, search, compare, selfwrite, add, delete )
{userdn | groupdn)="Idap:///dn";)
The target specifies the entry where ACI rule will be effective. Usually, the target is the 
same as the entry’s DN. Targetattr specifies one or more attributes that the access 
control information applies to. Access control rules can apply to specific attributes. This 
parameter provides more strict access to attributes such as user password. Target filter is 
an optional parameter that can be used to apply to specific entries based on a filter. The 
filter has the same syntax as a filter provided to the Idapsearch command. The 
permissions parameter consists of the version number, the ACI name, the operation 
including allow and deny, the permissions including read, write, search, compare, add, 
delete and selfwrite which allows a user to add or delete himself from a group.
During our data design, we have to specify who can write data to the directory. First, 
allow CodeNet administrator to do anything related creating and managing whole entries, 
and then allow read only access to the directory for everyone. We give the 
“Administrator” all access to our directory. It will be used to perform any operations in 
the directory. The ACI for the user cn=Admmistrator,o=CodeNet,c=ca is as follows:
(target="ldap:///o=CodeNet,c=CA")(targetattr=*)
(version 3.0; acl "codenet admin"; allow (all) 
userdn="Idap:///cn=Administrator, o=CodeNet, c=CA";)
We allow all non-anonymous users to see pmiUser object class and can access our LDAP 
server to retrieve their attribute certificates. The ACI for all the users who has the account 
in LDAP server is as follows:
{target="Idap:///o=CodeNet,c=CA ")(targetattr=*)
(targetfilter="(objectclass=pmiUser)”)(version 3.0; 
acl "AC users"; allow (compare, read, search)
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The LDAP protocol supports anonymous access, which allows easy access to the
directory. It allows any user to access our directory without authentication. We only allow
anonymous access for read and search privileges of anonymous access as follows:
{version 3.0; acl "anonymous-read"; 
allow (read, search) userdn = ”Idap:///anyone”;)
5.1.5 Creating LDAP Server Certificate for SSL
In order to implement SSL between LDAP Server and its clients, the LDAP server must 
have a security certificate, and the client must be configured to trust this certificate. The 
server sends its certificate to the client to perform server authentication using public-key 
cryptography. The client and server then begin to encrypt all data transmitted over the 
network.
OpenSSL is a cryptography toolkit implementing the SSL network protocols. It also 
implements a wide range of cryptographic algorithms used in various Internet standards. 
OpenSSL toolkit includes three parts: the SSL library, the Crypto library and the
command line tool. We use these tools to create self-signed certificate for our LDAP
server.
We create our configure file “myopenssl.cnf ”, the main content is shown in Figure 5-7.
# This is our own OpenSSL configuration file for creating CA
# and certificates.
HOME = .
RANDFILE = $EJW: : HOME/. rnd
# Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info:
#oid_file = SENW::HOME/.D id
oid_section = new_oids
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
[ ca ]
default_ca = CodeNetCA
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
Figure 5-7." Our OpenSSL Configure File
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# Where everything is kept
# Where the issued certs are kept
# database index file.
# default place for new certs.
# The CA certificate
# The current serial number 
$dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key 







= usrcert # The extentions to add to the cert
# Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional"






# Subject Name options
# Certificate field options
# how long to certify for
# how long before next CRL
# which ltd to use.
policy = policy_match
# For the CA policy 
[ policy_match ]
CountryName = optional
StateOrProvinceName = optional 










req_di stingui shed_name 
reg_attributes







# Passwords for private keys
# input_password = secret
# output_password = secret
# req_extensions = v3_req 















if not present they will be prompted for
The extensions to add to a certificate request 
Country Name (2 letter code)
=  2
=  2
= State or Province Name (full name)
Locality Name (eg, city)
Organization Name (eg, company)
Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) 




Figure 5-7: Our OpenSSL Configure File (cont.)
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[ req_attributes 3
challengePassword = A challenge password
challengePassword_niin = 4
challengePassword_max = 20
unsfcructuredName = An optional company name
[ usr_cert ]
# These extensions are added when 'ca’ signs a request.
# requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. 
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
[ v3_req 3
# Extensions to add to a certificate request 
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalsignature, keyEncipherment 
[ v3_ca ]
# Extensions for a typical CA




Figure 5-7: Our OpenSSL Configure File (cont.)
Then we create certificates with OpenSSL on Linux using our configure file 
“myopenssl.cnf’. x509 is a certificate display and signing utility, -inform der j pem 
specifies the input format. Normally the command will expect an X509 certificate but this 
can change if other options such as -req are present, -req indicates a certificate request.
The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM is the base64 encoding 
of the DER encoding with header and footer lines added, - in  specifies the input filename 
to read a certificate from, -out specifies the output filename to write to. - text prints out 
the certificate in text form including the public key, signature algorithms, issuer and 
subject names, serial number any extensions present and any trust settings, -signkey 
makes the input file to be self signed using the supplied private key. If the input file is a 
certificate it sets the issuer name to the subject name, which makes it self signed. If the 
input is a certificate request then a self signed certificate is created using the supplied 
private key using the subject name in the request, - c a  specifies the CA certificate to be 
used for signing. The input file is signed by this CA, that is its issuer name is set to the
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subject name of the CA and it is digitally signed using the CAs private key. -CAkey sets 
the CA private key to sign a certificate with, -extfile specifies the file containing 
certificate extensions to use. -extensions adds certificate extensions from a specified 
file. The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the 
certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA, if the CA flag is 
false then it is not a CA. All CAs should have the CA flag set to true.
Figure 5-8 shows how we can create self-signed certificate as a server certificate. We first 
create a 1024 bit RSA key pair, public key will be included in the certificate request, and
private key is stored in our machine. Then we used the self sign function of OpenSSL to 
sign the request using the private key we have generated.
chenl2p@0[openssl-O.9.7d]$ openssi req -newkey rsa:1024 -config myopenssl.cnf 
keyout rootkey.pem -out rootreq.pem
Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key
writing new private key to 'rootkey.pem' 
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated 
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN. 
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank 
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
Country Name (2 letter code) [];CA 
State or Province Name {full name) []:
Locality Name (eg, city) []:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:CodeNet 
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:rootadmin 
Email Address []:
Please enter the following 'extra' attributes 
to be sent with your certificate request 
A challenge password []:
An optional company name []:
chenl2p@C[openssl-0.9.7d]$ openssi x509 -req -in rootreq.pem -extfile 




Enter pass phrase for rootkey.pem:
Figure 5-8: Creating Self-Signed Certificate
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chenl2p@0[openssl-0.9.7d]$ cat rootcert.pem rootkey.pem > root.pem 




Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: mdSWithRSAEncryption 
Issuer: C=CA, 0=CodeNet, CM=rootadmin 
Validity
Not Before: Mar 24 05:13:39 2004 GMT 
Not After : Apr 23 05:13:39 2004 GMT 
Subject: C=CA, 0=CodeNet, CN=rootadmin 
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit)
00 bO £3 95 cl ba 68 86 95 de 2b 2b 40 ed I t
10 2a 27 7f 17 50 fe fb 34 dS 00 aS 29 57 b4
8e 4a 48 fl 43 29 d2 5e Ic Od 3b 19 2a b8 30
be e6 7e bS 72 c6 ca bb 13 5c da fO 9e fd 20
c6 cb 55 60 9e f e 15 16 3d a2 6f 3.9 10 18 ba
20 99 3b 22 2a bf c9 00 5a 6d c8 9d d4 bf 8e
f6 9a d2 53 If bS 07 d6 eO b4 39 81 ba 30 e3
47 df 75 e5 16 15 2e GO 50 66 63 df 7c ea 06
Oc 28 7f 7b 6b eS be 40 57
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) 
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
21:A2:2A:2C:7A:1A:28:03:79:00: 








12 If:23: e 8 99 e4 bl 89 dS 56 f3 el bb ba ae bl a9 a9
3e 2b:79:c6 e7 c6 88 le 17 a8 ed 13 2a 4a Oc fl 5c 06
94 ba:c7:56 66 a6 7d d7 £8 Of 84 ee a4 bS 39 2a 16 e7
ae 6f:82:20 54 72 79 Ic 25 46 d.8 eB c8 d3 ed Of ec ce
83 85:aa:cb cl 12 8c e9 c8 90 64 6f 99 aS 14 59 06 98





dO 5e 78 CO 42 f c bf 59 44 aS 5f 8f 81 a8
Figure 5-8: Creating Self-Signed Certificate (cont.)
A secure connection encrypts all data during the communication over the network. 
Clients may establish secure connections through the secure port using the Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL).
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5.2 Adding ACs into LDAP Server
5.2.1 Obtaining OID
Each LDAP object class or attribute must be assigned a unique name and object identifier 
(OID). One OID is enough because we can add another level of hierarchy to create new 
branches for our attributes and object classes. Obtain an OID from the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (lANA) or a national organization. ANSI also provide this service, 
but it require to pay, so we choose lANA and apply it through their website 
http://www.iana.org/cgi-bin/enterprise.pl. And our OID is prefixed with 1.3.6.1.4.1 (the 
private Internet OID) after we obtain the number from lANA.
For the management of hosts and gateways on the Internet a data structure for the 
information has been defined. The data structure is the "Structure and Identification of 
Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets" (SMI) [RFC1155], and the 
"Management Information Base for Network Management of TCP/IF-based Internets" 
(MIB-II) [RFC1213]. The SMI provides parameters or codes to indicate private data 
structures. The assignment for our OID is listed in Figure 5-9.
Prefix: iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprise (1.3.6.1.4.1)
See the file "enterprise-nnmbers".
http://WWW.iana.ora/assianments/enterorise-mimbers 
SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes:
19569




Figure 5-9: Obtain Private Internet OID from IANA
So our internationally registered Object Identifier (OID) is 1.3.6.1.4.1.19569. It is 
possible to create a hierarchical structure of subordinate identifiers using this OID. This
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approach allows us to obtain more OID for various attributes or information.
5.2.2 Creating ACs
ACs are used to perform authorization for users. They associate attributes with users. The 
certificate includes several fields that are similar to identity certificate. We create an AC 
which includes version, serial number, user’s DN, roles and time validity.









MAY ( x509acHolderPKCSerialNuinber $ 
x509acHolderPKCissuerDK 
x509acHolderRfc822Name $ 






x5 0 91s suerDnsName $ 




x5 0 9authori tyCertSerialKumber ))
Figure 5-10; X509 Attribute Certificate Object Class
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Figure 5-11 shows attribute types defined in [Klasen02] which are often used in 
corresponding fields of ACs.
x509serialNumber: used to hold the serial number of the AC
x509version: used to hold the version of the AC
x509signatureAlgorithin: used to hold the OID of the algorithm used to sign
the CRL
x509issuer: used to hold the DN of the AC issuer
x509validityNotBefore: used to hold the not before validity time of the AC
x509validityNotAfter; used to hold the not after validity time of the AC
x509authorityCertIssuer: used in conjunction with
x509authorityCertSerialNumber to identify the PKC of the AC issuer 
x509authorityCertSerialNumber: used in conjunction with x509authorityCertIssuer 
to identify the PKC of the AC issuer
x509issuerRfc822Name: used to hold the email address of the AC issuer
x509issuerDnsName: used to hold the DNS name of the AC issuer
x509issuerURI: used to hold a URI for the AC issuer
x509issuerIpAddress: used to hold the IP address of the AC issuer
x509issuerRegisteredID: used to hold a registered OID of the AC issuer
x509authorityKeyIdentifier: used to hold the identifier of the public key used 
to sign the AC
Figure 5-11: Attribute Certificate Attribute Types
The user’s privilege is related with roles because each role will be assigned a certain set 
of access privileges. We provide a role design as in Table 4 for each user who belongs to 
one of the four groups. And each group has different permission to access the resource. 
The role information will be added into the attribute field of AC of each user. When 
performing the authorization later, the information of role will be extracted from the AC 
of the user.
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User Role Permission Resource
userS General User Read, search Limited DBl
userO, user4, 
userS




System User Read, search, add, 
execute
Full DBl, limited 
DB2
administrator Administrator R.eaci, search, add, 
delete, execute
Full DBl, Full DB2
Table 4: Roles and Permissions Design
Each AA should have its own Public Key Certificate which is used to sign the ACs. So 
we use OpenSSL to create AA’s certificate. Its subject name or distinguish name is 
“CN=CodeNetAA, 0=CodeNet, C=CA”. We use CA’s private key which is included in 
file “root.pem” to sign AA’s certificate. Figure 5-12 shows the detailed information on 
how to generate AA’s certificate.
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Figure 5-12: Creating Certificate for Attribute Authority (AA)
We use RSA (Rivest Shamir Adeimaa) algorithm for digital signature. In order to sign, 
first compute the message digest, then encrypt the message using AA’s private key. After 
we obtain the AA’s certificate which is called “CodeNetServerCert”, then we will put it 
with its private key “CodeNetServerKey” and the CA’s certificate “rootcert” which issues 
AA’s certificate together.
chenl2p®0[openssl-0.9.7d]$ cat CodeNetServerCert.pem CodeNetServerKey.pem 
rootcert.pem > CodeNetServer.pem
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chenl2p@0[openssl-0.9.7d]$ openssl pkcsl2 -export -in CodeNetServer.pem -out 
CodeNetServer.pl2
Enter pass phrase for CodeNetServer.pem:
Enter Export Password:
Verifying - Enter Export Password:
Then we use the following basic information for creating AC including role, and we also 
use our own OID to represent the role attribute.
AC version: vl or v2
Holder Name: cn=user8,o=CodeNet,c=ca 
Issuer Name: cn=CodeNetAA,o=CodeNet,c=ca 
Serial No.: 379908
Validity Period: from 2004/03/01 to 2004/05/01 
CodeNetRole: 1.3.6.1.4.1.19569.1.1 (general user)
Then we use attribute authority AA’s private key which is in the file 
“CodeNetServer.pl2” to sign the AC. After using AA’s certificate to sign the AC, it is in 
binary form as follows:
0, VO U05;3al0/10
■ ~U“ ■ z''CAlh0 • ~U“z"CodeNetlO ’ ~U"~z“User807H50310 ' ~U~ ' z''CAlL0 ' ~U"z"CodeNetl 
ZOh'~U'~zCodeNetAAO’*tHt^ ''~“i”02 20040301000000.000-
0500 20040501000000.000-05000-0 ’ + ‘ ~g' 'Izgeneral userO O’ * tHf-f-
~A S 'X 6 iBUEVtA'ST-^ «°1A: [a6Z3e/”»%sy&n-> h /[: i < < g  | %wS'd>Sb E j “ :
We use Textpad editor to view the AC we created as in Figure 5-13, in binary form we
can still see some information in the certificate such as the pieces of the distinguished 
names, validity period, and even roles. However, A digital signature is an encrypted 
digest of the content. If the role or other information is modified by any attacker, the 
modification will break the signature because the digest of the certificate will not be the 
same as original.
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Figure 5-13: Viewing Attribute Certificate (AC)
5.2.3 Storing AC on LDAP Server
We have extended the schema to allow ACs to be stored in our 
However, we can only add ACs to existing entries. So before 
server, we first create an entry for the AC holder.
LDAP directory server, 
ig an AC to LDAP
After we create the new attribute for ACs in LDAP server, we will set value to them. 
Attribute for ACs are in binary form. Binary attribute values are marked with the 
attribute;binary subtype which indicates the content of an attribute. Subtypes may 
be added to attribute names in the LDIF statements used with the idapmodify command 
as follows:
Idapmodify -h kentS.galab.uwindsor.ca -p 389 -D 






file:I I I c h e n l 2 p / u s e r 2 .ace
To add a binary value, we can write it in the LDIF text or read it from the file. In order to
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use the < syntax to specify a filename, we must begin the LDIF statement with the line 
version:!, and the space should be added before and after <. When idapmodify 
processes this statement, it will set the attribute to the value which is read from the given 
file after < . When modifying an entry, the attributes must be allowed by the object 
classes in the entry, and attributes must contain values that match our defined syntax. 
Directory Server performs schema checking to conform the object class or attribute to our
LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) is used for exchange directoiy information. LDIF 
is an ASCII format. It can be used to make changes to the LDAP server. Binary data can 
be referenced in an external file or included in-line BASE-64 encoded. LDIF files are 
simply ASCII files that describe a set of changes to be applied to a directory. We can use
an LDIF file to add multiple entries, to perform a mix of operations or to import an entire 
suffix.
LDIF is a textual representation of entries, attributes and their values. Its standard format 
is described in RFC 2849. When using LDIF, there are some important aspects such as 
command-line input, special characters, schema checking, and the order of entries. There 
is a strict order for the entries listed in the LDIF file. Parent entries must be listed before 
their children. When the server processes the LDIF text, it will create the parent entries 
before the children entries. We list an ou=Application entry container before the entries 
within the subtree as follows:
dn; o=CodeNet, c=CA
dn: ou=Application,o=CodeMet, c=CA
A p p l i c a t i o n  u s e r s  s u b t r e e  e n t r i e s  
dn; ou=Maintenance,dc=example,dc=com 
M a in te n a n c e  u s e r s  s u b t r e e  e n t r i e s
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6. TESTING AND EVALUATION
This chapter covers the testing issues using various tools and the evaluations on the whole 
security architecture. Section 6.1 describes the testing about connections between client 
and server. Section 6.2 describes how to use various Web browsers to test LDAP URL. 
Section 6.3 provides details on using LBE to test our LDAP server and operations on 
attribute certificates. Section 6.4 introduces the features of the architecture. Section 6.5 
describes the analysis of search algorithm and performance. Section 6.6 lists the 
limitation of the design and implementation of the enhanced security architecture.
6.1 Testing Client and Server Connection
We use the “netstat” tool to examine if the connection between LDAP client and server 
has established. Figure 6-1 describes the connections on client machine whose host name 
is “kent2.galab.uwindsor,ca” (137.207.234.171), while Figure 6-2 shows the connections 
on our LDAP server whose host name is “kent8.galab.uwindsor.ca” (137.207.234.121). 
From Figure 6-2, we can see LDAP server is always listening on any LDAP request when 
the server is running. If the connection between LDAP client and server has been 
established, the state of connections will be “ESTABLISHED” which is shown in the 
following figures.
From the client in Figure 6-1, local address is “kent2: 2410”, foreign address is 
“kentS.galab.uwindsor.ca: Map”, the state is “ESTABLISHED”, which means the client 
“kent2” has comected with the LDAP server “kentS”. From the server in Figure 6-2, 
local address is “kentS: Map”, foreign address is “kent2. galab .uwindor. ca: 2410”, the state 
is “ESTABLISHED” too. Therefore, client and LDAP server have established the 
connection with each other.
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Figure 6-1: LDAP Client Connections State
Figure 6-2; LDAP Server Connections State
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In any case, the following configurations apply for every client:
® LDAP server: kent8.galab.uwindsor.ca
• Search base: c=ca
® Port number: 389
If a firewall is existed in the domain of LDAP server, the firewall should be configured 
by its system administrator in order to make it be accessed from another domain. 
Otherwise, the connection can not be established.
Another problem is also need to be considered. The idle timeout specifies the idle time of 
a connection between client to the server before the server drops the connection. Within a 
configuration entry "cn=config”, there is an attribute “nsslapd-idletimeout” which 
Specifies the time after which an idle LDAP client connection is closed by the server. 
This value is given in seconds. During the idle period, the connection remains open, but 
no operations are requested. For example, if we set its value is 300 seconds, then after 
five minutes, the connection status is fi*om “ESTABLISHED” to “CLOSE WAIT”. But 
timeout setting will not stop normal search operation to the server. It is only applied to the 
idle period. We should limit idle time for the client applications to access directory server. 
Leaving them idle or unused may impact server performance because of opening many 
connections.
62  Using Web Browser
A Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is a short string of characters that identifies a 
resource through its primary access mechanism such as its network address. It is a 
standard way to name hypertext link destinations for web browsers. Figure 6-3 describes 
a format for an LDAP Uniform Resource Locator. The format describes an LDAP search 
operation to perform to retrieve information from an LDAP directory.
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URL Definition
<ldapurl> ::= "ldap://“ [ <hostport> ] "/“ <dn> [ <attributes>
[ ”?" <scope> "?” <filter> ] ]
<hostport> : : = <hostnarae> [ " : ” <portnumber> ]
<dn> ::= a string as defined in RFC 1485 
<attributes> ::= NULL | <attributelist>
<attributelist> ::= <attributetype>
j <attributetype> [ "," <attributelist> ] 
<attributetype> ::= a string as defined in RFC 1777 
<scope> "base" j 'one” | "sub"
<filter> ::= a string as defined in RFC 1558
Figure 6-3: LDAP URL Format
This scheme supports queries to the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for 
hierarchically organized information including user and resources. It uses
Idap;//hostport/dn?attributes?scope?f liter as LDAP URL. The <dn> is an 
LDAP Distinguished Name using the string format. It identifies the base object of the 
LDAP search (RFC 2253). The <attributes> construct is used to indicate which attributes 
should be returned from the entry. Individual <attributetype> names are as defined for 
AttributeType in RFC 1777. If the <attributes> part is not used, all attributes of the entry 
will be returned. The <scope> is used to specify the scope of the search to perform in the 
LDAP server. The allowable scopes are ‘%ase” for a base object search, “one” for a one- 
level search, or “sub” for a sub tree search. If scope is omitted, “base” is assumed. The 
<filter> is used to specify the search filter which makes it return subset of entries. If 
omitted, all entries should be returned. A default filter is (objectClass=*). More 
information on the LDAP URL scheme is available in RFC 2255. We make a quer>' that 
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This URL corresponds to a base object search of the "o=codenet, c=ca” entry using a 
filter of (objectdass=*), requesting all subentries from the LDAP server 
kentS . galab.uwindsor. ca OH port 389.
We have tested our LDAP server by using LDAP URL from several representative 
machines with some popular Web browsers including Microsoft’̂  Internet Explorer (see 
Figure 6-4), Netscape'^ Communicator (see Figure 6-5) in a Microsoft"  ̂ Windows 
environment and Konqueror (see Figure 6-6) which is built in KDE in Linux.
fteJ u » S  '4-2ld.so;?tenfe£.galab,uvi!indsor c a ;5 6 9 /o = c 3 d e n 8 S ,t= c a ''su b '
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Figure 6-4; Coimeeting LDAP Server using IE 
(Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0)
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Figure 6-4 shows the search result after using LDAP URL; 
“ldap://keat8.galab.uwindsor.ca:389/o=codenet,c-ca??sub?” in IE 6.0. It returns all the
information from userO to userS within the subentries of Base DN “ o=codenet, c=ca” 
from the LDAP server. Using “sub” performs a sub tree search.
Using Netscape Communicator 4.8 to connect LDAP server, Figure 6-5 shows all the 
attributes of Base DN “o=codenet, c=ca” without any subentries after using 
“Idap;//kent8.gaIab.uwindsor.ca/o=codenet, c=ca” which performs only a base object
search.
a  !t ^  At
Bacfe fte tesd  rtai^s Search GUde PrW









Figure 6-5: Connecting LDAP Server using Netscape
(Netscape Communicator 4.8)
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Figure 6-6: Connectmg LDAP Server using Konqueror
(Konqueror 3.1.3 on Linux)
Figure 6-6 shows ail the entries of only one level under the Base DN “o==codenet, c=ca” 
in the Konqueror Web browser in linux. “ldap://kent8.galab.uwindsor.ca/o=codenet, 
c=ca” performs only a one-level search.
6 J  Using LDAP Browser/Editor
The client of the LDAP can use the LDAP protocol to request information from an LDAP 
server. The nature of LDAP allows computers on any platform to communicate with 
LDAP directory server. The LDAP Browser/Editor (LBE) allows users to view the entries 
stored in a LDAP server in a hierarchical manner. It also allows modifications of the 
LDAP contents. We use the LBE to test our LDAP server. Figure 6-8 shows the results 
after using LBE to connect with LDAP server.
The LDAP Browser/Editor provides an interface to LDAP directories server with tightly 
integrated browsing and editing capabilities. It requires Java version 1.2.2 or greater. The 
Browser will first try to use the Java interpreter specified by the JAVA_HOME 
environment variable. We can run the browser with a different Java environment by
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setting the JAVA_HOME environment variable from the command line before starting 
the Browser. For Windows, we use C:\ldapbrowser>set JAVA_HOME=c;\jdkl .3; for 
Linux, we use ~/ldapbrowser>setenv JAVA_HOME /sandbox/jdkl.3. After the 
connection between LBE and our LDAP serv'er is successfully established, we use it to 
add, delete and modify entries and their attributes (see following Figures) in the LDAP 
directory remotely.
From LBE main menu “File”, we choose “New Window”, and then we enter all the 
information including the host, port no, base DN, User DN and password for 
authentication (see Figured-?). The information is used for connecting with LDAP server.
Infn
iV - i-.:,
r -/ - . ; 
'I' ‘‘ .. 0 i-'TS
; : Cancel
Figure 6-7; Configuration for LBE
If the connection is established, directory information tree of the LDAP server will be 
shown as Figure 6-8.
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Figure 6-8: Connecting LDAP Server using LBE
Figure 6-9, Figure 6-10 and Figure 6-11 show how to add new entries to the directory. If 
the entry is successfully created, it will be shown on the tree (see Figure 6-11). And in 
Figure 6-9, using “Delete Entry” will deletes the selected entry or entries on the tree. This 
will only work if the entries have no children. In order to remove entries with children, 
delete tool provided by “Delete Tree” function found in the “Delete Entry” tab.
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Figure 6-9: Adding an Entry Using LBE (1)
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Figure 6-10 shows adding a new organization onto LDAP server. Fill in the required 






Figure 6-10: Adding an Entry Using LBE (2)
Figure 6-11 shows the result after adding a new entry, we can see “o=neworganization’' 
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Figure 6-11: Adding an Entry Using LBE (3)
Figure 6-12 and Figure 6-13 shows how to view all the attributes. The attribute names and 
values are displayed in the attribute table.
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Figure 6-12: Viewing Attribute Using LBE (1)
Figure 6-13 shows the attribute for ACs. The value of an “attributeCertificateAttribute” is 
binary and the size is 310 bytes. We can obtain this AC and save it in a file using 'save as' 
button.
H e  | «  M ie «  p iF  Hs%s
| 3  c=ca /'A ttibute
?  C3 o=CodeNet •. isttributsf.s
®"C3 cn=adminis' ■-'h.s: rf.t-jc
J  9  w=user8 ; a itriM itg C s rtiic .a te S « riji4 8 : 
?"C3ou=ou1 ... . .
0* C3 cn=CodeNstaA
# ’d  ou=mainte' i






Figure 6-13: Viewing Attribute Using LBE (2)
From Figure 6-14 to Figure 6-17 shows how we can add “attributeCertificateAttribute” to
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a user entry, and then upload its corresponding AC from files to the entry. Figure 6-14 the 
frmctions provided by LBE including “Add Attribute” and “Delete Attribute” which can 
delete the selected attribute or attributes of the specified entry. In the following figures, 
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Figure 6-14: Adding AC onto LDAP Remotely Using LBE (1)
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D  0U=0U1
 ̂ Q  cn=CodeNelM 
f" ilo u = n iam !en an ce  X tr- mudi, 










Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
After choosing “Add Attribute” in Figure 6-14, a window prompts for the attribute name 
and type shown in Figure 6-15. Enter the attribute name “attributeCertificateAttribute” 
and select a binary for the attribute.
Then an editor window will appear with the attribute name in Figure 6-16. We use the 
“Insert from” button to load the AC file “aa-user4.ace”, and press “Apply” to add it into 
LDAP server.
- ip ; [ f  
" . =  -I 'f -  ^  o = C o d e N e t  I  # ~ f P l  c r i = a d m i n i s t r a t o rI ^  £23 c n = u s e r OI C 3 c n = u s e r 8
I ©' C3 ou=oui
f ® ” C3c n = u s e 2̂
i l 3  cn=assrS
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Figure 6-16: Adding AC onto LDAP Remotely Using LBE (3)
Figure 6-17 shows the final results about adding AC, a new attribute certificate whose 
value is Binary and size is 332 bytes has been added in the LDAP Server.
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Figure 6-17; Adding AC onto LDAP Remotely Using LBE (4)
LBE supports the LDIF file format. “Export” ftmction can store the selected entry or 
entries into a LDIF file. We can also import entries fi'om a LDIF file and insert them into 
the LDAP direc to ry . Figure 6-18  shows how to export an entry “c=ca” with ail its 
children that is the subentries into one LDIF file called “codenet-users.ldif’. Figure 6-19 
shows the result for the export operation, “Exported 14 entries” means 14 subentries of 
“c=ca” has been exported successfully.
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Figure 6-18; Exporting LDIF File Using LBE (1)
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Figure 6-19: Exporting LDIF Fie  Using LBE (2)
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6.4 Features
This thesis describes enhanced security architecture by using LDAP server and attribute 
certificates which can support distributed access control. Our proposed architecture for 
MyProxy repository is both new and innovative. With this new approach and architecture, 
it makes both users and resource providers access and manage their resource more 
securely and coEveniently. Each resource provider only needs to define their access 
policies and need not keep the information of all users. They can manage a large number 
of users by using both MyProxy and LDAP server. The overhead at the resource 
providers will reduce because they only make access decision on a set of roles rather than 
a great number of users.
The features of this innovative architecture are as follows:
• Enhanced Security. Design enhanced security architecture to provide 
decentralized authorization. The attribute certificates are stored in LDAP 
directories so that they can be accessed via the Internet. This allows the 
administration of privileges to be widely distributed over the Internet. It also 
supports role based access control. We combine with authentication and 
authorization mechanism based on PKC (public key certificate) and AC (attribute 
certificate).
Scalability. Access policy based on roles or groups in attribute certificates 
supports the scalability. When adding a new user, we only need to create an AC 
for that user and put it onto the LDAP server, it will not affect the other 
component of the system. And LDAP ser\w also supports user entries up to one 
million which can meet the requirements of the increased number of users.
Accessibility. In our architecture, MyProxy allows users to access their proxy 
identity certificates from anywhere and LDAP server also allows users to upload 
or retrieve their attribute certificates from anywhere. Users can access grid
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resources by using their identity certificates and ACs to perform authentication 
and authorization at anywhere.
® Flexibility. This architecture enable distributed resource providers to control their 
resources and specify access requirements flexibly. They can define their own 
access policy for various roles or attributes. Resource providers can create or 
change any type of roles of a user, and ACs can also be retrieved on different 
platforms such as Windows and Linux.
® Integration. Our architecture can integrate with many current technologies. 
Attribute certificates can integrate with PKC infrastructures (see Chapter 4.1); 
MyProxy can integrate with GSI (see Chapter 2.2); and LDAP can be easily 
integrated with different Web browsers (see Chapter 6.2).
6.5 Analysis on Performance of LDAP Server
We used Sun One Directory Server 5.2 as the basis for implementing our LDAP server 
and authorization schema. The document [SunOS] for Sun ONE Directory Server 5.2 on 
the Sun Website describes in detail its key features. This LDAP server is designed to
deploy extensible, secure, global directory services. We list some of it functionality as 
follows [SunOS]:
* 64-bit large cache support for high volum e deploym ents
* Configurable encryption f o r  all attributes
® D irectory access through D SM L v2 fo r  web services
* Replication m onitoring and m anagem ent tools to handle large topologies
* Sun Cluster agents f o r  additional high availability services
This product represents the current state-of-the-art in server architecture and performance 
and can be used to gauge the achievability of suitable support for authorization handling. 
We focus on the analysis of search performance of LDAP server. The Sun ONE Directory 
Server 5.2 can run as a 64-bit application. It can use a cache larger than the 4 GB limit.
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Using the large cache allows better performance for high-volume systems. The multiple 
database architecture of the Sun ONE Directory Sender supports distributed naming 
contexts. It provides large scalability to support millions of users on a single system. The 
entry, database, and import caches can be larger than 4 GB. With the increased cache size, 
searches can scale linearly on servers with up to 12 processors. High-performance design 
supports 64-bit caching on Solaris and HP-UX operating systems. Performance is also 
improved through reduced memory allocation and improved thread management.
To use one example, Sun One Directory Server has the best performance for over a 
million entries based on previous testing statistics. Those performance tests cover loading, 
searching, adding, deleting and modifying the data. Tests were performed on directory 
trees containing up to 10 million entries [SunOS], Based on these operating characteristics 
and performance of an LDAP server, we use it to provide directory services for storing 
ACs in our security architecture for grid systems.
It must be kept in mind that the size of the search path will be limited by hardware (e.g. 
disk drives), and by the relative population of the directory entries at each level in the 
LDAP hierarchy. Hence, smaller machines may retain higher request latency even though 
the total number of LDAP entries is much smaller.
6.6 Observations of Search Query Performance
When the client is initialized, an IF address of LDAP server and a search base is 
specified. This information can be specified as a command line argument to the Idapclient 
command, or be provided by other client tools. For example, if we want to find 
“cn=userO, o==CodeNet, c=ca” The steps that the Idapclient command perform are;
1. Search the LDAP server from the base ON “c=ca” which is specified by client. Typical 
number of “country” in the world maybe about 200.
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2. Search the foand base DN for an entry containing an object class such as 
“organization”. The real number may change from hundreds to millions according to 
different countries.
3. Check the found organization attribute of the entry to verify if its value equals the 
value “CodeNet” stored in the client's request.
4. Search the cia=* or ou=* directly below the entry “o=CodeNet, c=ca” for an entry that 
matches the cx)mmon name or name of organizatioii unite provided by client. In this 
example, if the value of on equals “userO”, then the entry requested has been found.
We note that the directory structure is a tree and hierarchy supports a “divide and 
conquer” strategy for searching; this leads immediately to logarithmic complexity in the 
partitioning of the search spaces. It is to be noted that the search algorithm currently used 
in LDAP is the linear search technique, but for relatively small search lists this achieves 
good performance. At the lowest level of the directory hierarchy the search space is 
typically must larger and linear search may be slow. In order to improve the performance, 
we would recommend further study on the use of both binary search and hashing 
techniques. These matters have been left as subjects for possible future work.
6.7 Limitations
In this thesis research, our focus has been on the architectural design based on 
fundamental notions of authorization. We also provide the deployment and testing of the 
LDAP server for the proposed architecture. In practice, a production level Grid portal 
should be capable of handling the increased capabilities of authorization, in addition to 
the conventional authentication capability exhibited within MyProxy, for example. Such 
a tool must be quite flexible, robust and afford significant guarantees to users. There are 
some limitations for our proposed security architecture. These include:
• Before using LDAP director}' server in grid environments, some problems such as 
firewall should be considered and solved. Otherwise the LDAP server may not be
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accessed outside the firewall. From the outside, it may be inaccessible because our 
authorization approach will serve the need of grid nodes featuring substantial 
resources. As such, the installation, including integration within existing 
environments, might be a complex task involving various IT professionals, 
particularly, system administrators. Such circumstances are not uncommon in 
large institutions, however.
® Some versions of LDAP may not support storing attribute certificates; these
include examples such as Microsoft Active Directory or the old version of Sun
server.
® In section 6.2, testing has been done using some Web browsers. IE and Netscape
are both popular in Windows system, and Konqueror is also widely used in Linux. 
To determine the grade of compatibility to support LDAP URL, future testing on 
other Web browsers, different versions and operating systems may be needed.
• In a certificate-based architecture, there is the problem of certificate revocation 
when making certificates invalidate after they have been issued but before their 
expiration dates. All the revocation methods add complexity and cost to the access 
control architecture. In large-scale distributed networks, it is impossible to 
implement real-time revocation as in a centralized system. Therefore, we limit the 
validity time and authorization information in the certificates rather than using 
revocation lists. These remaining problems will need further research.
In addition to the problems of limitations listed above, there exist a variety of specific 
system functionalities that have not been developed for the thesis. Such ‘Isells and 
whistles” would be added, both internally and externally, as in GUI applications, in a 
production system version.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUEE WORK
In this chapter we provide a summary of the work presented in this thesis, and identify 
what has been achieved. We conclude with an account of future work.
7.1 Summary of Thesis
Computational grids are an emerging technology that allows the combination of widely
distributed resources to support large-scale computations. We have presented a 
comprehensive survey of security technologies, policy specification approaches and 
various security architectures. We proposed an enhanced grid security architecture for 
support of MyProxy online credential repository.
Our enhanced security architecture provides decentralized authorization. The attribute 
certificates can be accessed via the Internet. This allows the administration of privileges 
to be widely distributed over the Internet. It also supports role based access control and 
delegation. We combine with authentication and authorization mechanism by using both 
MyProxy online credential repository and LDAP directory server. It enables end users 
and resource providers to access resources through X.509 attribute certificates that carry 
authorization information such as role or rights and policy statements.
A person can be assigned a role and get all the rights applying to the role. It conveniently 
specifies the rights and duties for a user. Based on these concepts, we have designed 
attribute certificates with role information, and build an LDAP server for storing and 
uploading them. These services enable user management by support of RBAC and 
improve the abilities of existing systems that focus on authorization.
Our security mechanisms, based on a public-key infrastructure, have been added for the 
secure support of authorization and the integration of existing grid security software. The
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solution employs attribute certificates to bind rights to users and facilitates managing 
privileges. In our approach, attribute certificates support short-lived lifetime and contain 
attributes, multiple attributes can be added in one AC. A PKC is used to authenticate a 
user, and an AC describing attributes is used for authorization.
We have designed attribute certificates with role information, and build an LDAP server 
for storing and uploading them. These services enable user management by support of 
RBAC and improve the abilities of existing systems that focus on authorization. Our 
approach makes use of the online credential repository to build authentication, delegation 
and attribute based access control together to provide enhanced security for grid systems. 
Section 4.3 describes the three components in our proposed security architecture, and six 
basic steps for providing both authentication and authorization service. In this thesis, we 
address the second component of our security architecture, LDAP directory server, and 
provide details on how to design our schema for support of ACs. We also tested our 
LDAP server in different platforms using Web browsers and LEE. Our enhanced security 
architecture is able to integrate many well-known techniques, such as X.509, SSL, LDAP, 
and MyProxy, which provide compatibility with current security technologies. The design 
of the enhanced security architecture for support of MyProxy and the deployment of 
LDAP server for storing AC are both innovative and constitute the main contributions of 
this thesis.
Our architecture provides for distributed management of role based access control over 
resources. It allows resource providers to share the authorization information of users and 
control their resources remotely, and may allow users to access multiple resources by 
using the same roles or different roles. Our proposed architecture improves the security 
services of computational grids. This research is motivated to support sharing 
authorization information and facilitate collaborations of grid users. It also contributes to 
the scalability of security mechanisms in grid environments.
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12  Future Research Directions
The next stages of the development in this architecture are described as follows:
® For this thesis research we concentrated on the problem of authorization applied to 
a single resource-provider node. We used the Sun One director}'- server version 
5.2 and deployed it on a single server. In general, however, it is important to use 
multiple servers across various domains for large-scale networks. To deal with the 
increased problems of multiple resource-provider nodes 'that might share 
authorization information additional work is required on the management issues 
inherent to an extended architecture.
® MindCraft’s DirectoryMark 1.2.1 is widely recognised as the industry 
performance benchmark for LDAP directories. Using this measurement tool for 
testing query response time and the practical throughput of the LDAP server 
would be highly useful in detected areas for improvement in design, such as the 
core search algorithms.
• Security policy needs to be designed for resource providers and the authorization 
model for executing the policy together with ACs needs to be developed for the 
proposed security architecture.
• Develop a grid portal which is able to support authentication and authorization 
service using proxy credentials and attribute certificates.
• Integrating this work with the GSI (Globus) work through an integrated 
environment including MyProxy for the simulation and viewing the results should 
be continued.
• Finally, integrating all management tools to provide a uniform interface will be 
developed further.
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And other possible foture developments may be includes: design an approach to solve the 
revocation problem, modifying the protocols of MyProxy to support different foms of 
credentials and integrate LDAP with more web technologies and protocols.
We believe that our contribution is an important step towards offering strong and 
enhanced security management for grid computing.
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APPENDIX
We attach all the user files and entries on our LDAP server based on our schema in LDIF 
file format in this appendix. This file can be used to deploy our user directory service. 
Each LDIF entry consists of a required distinguished name, object classes, and attribute 
definitions. The object class defines attribute types which are allowed and required for the 
entry. The attribute should be defined either in slapd.at.conf or in siapd.conf. In the 
LDIF file, each entry is separated by a blank line, and base 64 encoded attribute values 

























nsslapd-auditlog: C :/Program Files/Sim/MPS/slapd-kent8/logs/audit 
nsslapd-rootdn: cn=Directory Manager 
nsslapd-groupevalnestlevel: 5 
nsslapd-windows-authentication-enabled: off
aci: (targetattr = "*"){version 3.0; acl "Configuration Administrators Group”;
allow (all) groupdn = "Idap:///cn=Configuration Administrators, ou=Groups, 
ou=TopologyManagement, o=NetscapeRoot";) 
aci: (targetattr = “*“)(version 3.0; acl "Configuration Administrator”; allow
(all) userdn = "Idap:///uid=admin,ou=Administrators, ou=TopologyManagement, 
o=N'etscapeRoot”;)
aci: (targetattr = ”*")(version 3.0; acl "Iiocal Directory Administrators Group 
"; allow (all) groupdn = "Idap:///cn=Directory Administrators, dc=galab,dc=u 
Windsor,dc=ca";)
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aci: (targetattr = "*")(version 3.0; acl "SIE Group”; allow (all)groupdn = "Id
ap:///cn=slapd-lcent8, cn=Sun ONE Directory Server, cn=Server Group, cn=kenc8 
.galab.uwindsor.ca, ou=galab.uwindsor.ca, o=NetscapeRoot";) 
ds-verify-plugin-signature: off 
ds-require-valid-plugin-signature: on 










aci: (target=”Idap:///cn=schema")(targetattr !="aci”)(version 3.0;acl "anonymo 
us, no acis"; allow (read, search, compare) userdn = "Idap:///anyone";) 
aci: (targetattr = "*”)(version 3.0; acl "Configuration Administrators Group";
allow (all) groupdn = "Idap:///cn=Configuration Administrators, ou=Groups, 
ou=TopologyManagement, o=NetscapeRoot";) 
aci: (targetattr = "*")(version 3.0; acl "Configuration Administrator"; allow
(all) userdn = "Idap:///uid=admin,ou=Administrators, ou=TopologyManagement, 
o=NetscapeRoot";)
aci; (targetattr = ”*")(version 3.0; acl "Local Directory Administrators Group 
"; allow (all) groupdn = "Idap:///cn=Directory Administrators, dc=galab,dc=u 
Windsor,dc=ca";)
aci: (targetattr = "*“)(version 3.0; acl "SIE Group“; allow (all)groupdn = "Id
ap:///cn=slapd-kent8, cn=Sun ONE Directory Server, cn=Server Group, cn=kent8 
.galab.uwindsor.ca, ou=galab.uwindsor.ca, o=NetscapeRoot”;) 





attributeTypes: ( 2.5.4.58 NAME 'attributeCertificateAttribute' SYNTAX 1.3.6.
1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.5 X-ORIGIN 'user defined' ) 
objectClasses: ( 2.5.6.24 NAME 'pmiUser* SUP top STRUCTURAL MAY attributeCerti 
ficateAttribute X-ORIGIN 'user defined' ) 
nsSchemaCSN; 4047ede0000000000000
3 o suffix: c=ca
version: 1





creatorsName: cn=directory manager 
createTimestamp: 20040303091623Z
nsUnigueld: 6bdel981-ldd211b2-805a83d5-d7fb4a61
aci: (targetattr != "userPassword”) (version 3.0; acl ’Anonymous access"; alio 
w (read, write, search, compare)userdn = ''Idap:///anyone”; ) 
aci: (targetattr != "nsroledn||aci"}(version 3.0; acl "Allow self entry inodifi 
cation except for nsroledn and aci attributes"; allow (write)userdn ="Idap:/ 
//self";)
aci: (targetattr = ”*")(version 3.0; acl "Configuration Administrator"; allow
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(all) userdn = "Idap:///uid=admin,ou=Administrators, ou=TopologyManagement, 
o=NetscapeRoot";)
aci: (targetattr ="*">(version 3.0;acl "Configuration Administrators Group";al
low (all) (groupdn = "idap:///cn=Configuration Administrators, ou=Groups, ou 
=TopologyManagement, o=NetscapeRoot") ;) 
aci: (targetattr = "*")(version 3.0; acl "SIE Group"; allow (all)groupdn = "Id
ap:///c=ca”:) 
modifiersName: cn=directory manager 
modifyTimestamp: 20040312203709Z































modifiersName: cn=directory manager 
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QEBMRETB3JlZ21zdGVyZWQgdXNlcjAAMA0GCSgGSIb3DQEBBAUAA0EAlB8tJk6BWlV2HSNTeEMCs 
nzGajcZHqXTte?! jHIWGYaIjtvwSkbQRRrlh.Vc3EMlUfwiXZttU8Gecht/eHQS7zvw== 



















modifiersName: cn=directory manager 
modi fyTimes tamp: 20040403082634Z
# entry-id: 5
dn: ou=oul, o=CodeNet, c=ca 
postalCode: N9B 3P4 
objectClass: top 
objectClass: organizationalUnit 
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modifiersName: cn=directory manager 
modifyTimestamp: 20040403093753Z










modi fyTimes tamp: 20040312202350Z
nsUniqueld: 175d3bBl-ldd211b2-80ca83d5-d7fb4a61
# entry-id: 2














QswCQYDVQQGEwJDQTEQMA4GAlUEChMHQ2 9kZU5ldDESMBAGAlUEAxMUQ2 9kZU5IdEFBMAOGCSqGS 
IbSDQEBBAUAAgMFy/OwMhgXMjAwNDAzMDSwMDAwMDAuMDAwLTAlMDAYFzIwMDUwMzAxMDAwMDAwL 
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2r4dcfaI/+Kvw== 
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